# Pragmatism as an epistemology

#### Only pragmatism enables us to reconstruct philosophy to better understand social crises

West 89, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 71.-2 NP 2/25/17.

John Dewey is the culmination of the tradition of American pragmatism. After him, to be a pragmatist is to be a social critic, literary critic, or a poet -in short, a participant in cultural criticism and cultural creation. This does not mean that Dewey provides panaceas for philosophical prob-lems or solutions to societal crises. Rather, Dewey helps us see the complex and mediated ways in which philosophical problems are linked to societal cri**ses**. More important, Dewey enables us to view clashing conceptions of philosophy as struggles over cultural ways of life, as attempts to define the role and function of intellectual authorities in culture and society. For Dewey, to take modern historical consciousness seriously in philosophy is first and foremost to engage in metaphilosophical reflection, to reform and reconstruct philosophy as a mode of intellectual activity. To reform and reconstruct philosophy is both to demystify and to defend the most reliable mode of inquiry in modern culture, namely, critical intelligence best manifest in the community of scientists. And to demystify and defend critical intelligence is to render it more and more serviceable for the enhancement of human individuality, that is, the promotion of human beings who better control their conditions and thereby more fully create themselves (Le., advance creative democracy).

#### A Deweyan conception of philosophy is necessary to understand material human experiences and methodologies to resolve struggles

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On the philosophical front, Dewey articulates a conception of philos-ophy that gives professional expression to the Emersonian evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy. In fact, the dominant theme of his meta-philosophy is that philosophy is neither a form of knowledge nor a means to acquire knowledge. Rather philosophy is a mode of cultural critical action that focuses on the ways and means by which human beings have, do, and can overcome obstacles, dispose of predicaments, and settle prob-lematic situations. He states this succinctly in his "Philosophy and Democ-racy" address to the Philosophical Union of the University of California (November 29, 1918), the place where James publicly put forward pragma-tism in 1898 and Santayana mused about the genteel tradition in 1911. There is, I think, another alternative, another way out. Put badly, it is to deny that philosophy is in any sense whatever a form of knowledge. It is to say that we should return to the original and etymological sense of the word, and recognize that philosophy is a form of desire, of effort at action-a love, namely, of wisdom; but with the thorough proviso, not attached to the Platonic use of the word, that wisdom, whatever it is, is not a mode of science or knowledge. A philosophy which was conscious of its own business and province would then perceive that it is an intellec-tualized wish, an aspiration subjected to rational discriminations and tests, a social hope reduced to a working program of action, a prophecy of the future, but one disciplined by serious thought and knowledge. 40 For Dewey, philosophy is a mode not of knowledge but of wisdom. And wisdom is conviction about values, a choice to do something, a pref-erence for this rather than that form of living. Wisdom involves discrimi-nating judgments and a desired future. It presupposes some grasp of con-ditions and consequences, yet it has no special access to them. Rather methods of access must be scrutinized in order to decide which ones are most reliable for the task at hand. In this way, Dewey does not devalue knowledge but only situates it in human experience.

#### Meaning – whether of language, thought, belief or action -- can only be grounded in a framework of experience. That framework can only be understood within a pragmatist methodology.

West 89 summarizes and quotes Dewey, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 88-89. NP 2/25/17.

For Dewey, modern philosophy has five paradigmatic notions of experience: first, as a knowledge affair; second, as a psychical thing shot through with "subjectivity"; third, as registering what has taken place, with an exclusive focus on the past; fourth, as an aggregation of simple particulars; and last, as antithetical to thought. For Dewey, these five governing conceptions of experience constitute the pillars upon which rests the subject-object epistemological problematic of modern philosophy. His own transactional conception of experience, buttressed by Dar-winian biology and historical consciousness as well as rooted in Emersonian sensibilities, rejects each of these paltry ideas of experience. His three defi-nitions of experience in the essay lay bare his rejection and threefold debt. Experience is primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something; of suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these words. The organism has to endure, to undergo, the consequence of its own actions. Experience, in other words, is a matter of simultaneous doings and sufferings. Our undergoings are experiments in varying the course of events; our active tryings are trials and tests of ourselves ... Nothing can eliminate all risk, all adventure. The obstacles which confront us are stimuli to variation, to novel response, and hence are occasions for progress. If biological development be accepted, the subject of experience is at least an animal, continuous with other organic forms in a process of more complex organization. An animal in turn is at least continuous with chemico-physical processes which, in living things, are so organized as really to constitute the activities of life with all their defining traits. And experience is not identical with brain action; it is the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment, natural and social. The brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of behavior, not of knowing the world. And to repeat what has already been said, experiencing is just certain modes of interaction, of correlation, of natural objects among which the organism happens, so to say, to be one. It fol-lows with equal force that experience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of doing and suffering. Knowing must be described by discovering what particular mode-qualitatively unique-of doing and suffering it is.46 89 Dewey's metaphilosophy is essentially an act of intellectual regicide; he wants to behead modern philosophy by dethroning epistemology. For too long, modern philosophy has deferred to the authority of "knowl-edge" in the name of science, without questioning this authority and demystifying science, i.e., bringing it down to earth, as it were. There-fore, the diversity, complexity, and plurality of experience have been "assimilated to a nonempirical concept of knowledge. "47 This impoverished empiricism "has said Lord, Lord, Experience, Experience, but in practice it has served ideas forced into experience, not gathered from it."48 As I noted earlier, Dewey is demoting knowing without devaluing it. In fact, one can more fully appreciate the value of knowledge when it is viewed as an indispensable functional activity within the larger con-text of experience. Neglect of context leads toward gross distortion and truncation in epistemology-centered philosophy.

#### Scientific method is the best mechanism to understand and grapple with our world

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The second crucial point is that though critical intelligence deploys the scientific method, the results of science do not constitute the disclosure of the real. Dewey is no epistemological realist or ontological positivist, but rather a pragmatist with great faith in the power of critical intelligence. The cultural implication here is that Dewey's acceptance of the authority of science is itself instrumental-science is simply the best tool we conscious organisms have to cope with our environment. The metaphysical impli-cation is that although science has no monopoly on what is true and real, its predictive and explanatory powers help us deal more effectively with the world than anything else available to us.

#### Only pragmatism enables individuals to maintain a sense of self worth while reconciling with inevitable tragedy

West 89 summarizes and quotes Hook, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 121-22. NP 2/26/17.

In his conclusion, Hook adopts a Deweyan rhetoric, fused with Emersonian tropes of human creativity and possibility but purged of any utopian, optimistic, and subversive Emersonian elements. As I understand the pragmatic perspective on life, it is an attempt to make it possible for men to live in a world of inescapable tragedy-a tragedy that flows from the conflict of moral ideals-without lamenta-tion, defiance or make-believe. According to this perspective, even in the best of human worlds there will be tragedy-tragedy perhaps without bloodshed, but certainly not without tears ... Pragmatism ... sees in men something which is at once, to use the Sophoclean phrase, more wonderful and more terrible than anything else in the universe, viz., the power to make themselves and the world around them better or worse. In this way, pragmatic meliorism avoids ... romantic pessimism ... and grandiose optimism. Pragmatism, as I interpret it, is the theory and practice of enlarging human freedom in a precarious and tragic world by the arts of intelligent social control. It may be a lost cause. I do not know of a better one, and it may not be lost if we can summon the courage and intelligence to support our faith in freedom-and enjoy the blessings of a little luck.27 Unlike Emerson, Peirce, James, and Dewey, Hook conveys the sense of being cramped and constrained, a feeling of being hemmed in. He affirms the voluntaristic and moralistic aspects of the Emersonian theodicy, yet he refuses to accept the Emersonian idea that the world is somehow con-genial to human-especially American-aspirations. Hook believes neither nature nor history is biased in favor of human progress. In direct reference to Emerson, Hook writes: Even those unconventionally religious men like Emerson and Whitman who accept the world, and believe that man [people] can find security in cheerful affirmation of the natural conditions of his being, must recognize that Nature is no respecter of human purposes or human existence, that Nature can run amok-that the sufferings produced by the mindless intrusions of fire, ice, flood and wind in human affairs often dwarf those resulting from human cruelty. Jehova or Nature are bound by no rules of man.

#### Dewey’s philosophy does not devolve to abstract questions of philosophers but rather is embedded in context and materiality – only his understanding of knowledge allows us to appreciate it as contextual and gives room for social improvement and revision of ideas

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7) NP 2/26/17.

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuing a future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidarity captures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

#### Abstract ideals fail – they can not account for particularity and the gap between the actual and the ideal

Glaude 7 on James, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (20-21) NP 2/26/17.

Hook doesn’t go very far toward demonstrating how this notion of trag-edy informs the work of James and Dewey. He simply assumes it and moves on. But one can easily see this view of tragedy in the work of William James. James’s talk about the sick-soul and his tortured attempt to hold off the view that the world is a sea of disappointment testify to his intense grappling with tragedy. In “The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life” James ar-gues that the conflict of goods is an essential feature of our moral lives. He writes, “The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; and there is always the pinch between the ideal and the actual which can only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind. There is hardly a good which we can imagine except as competing for the possession of the same bit of space and time with some other imagined good.” And when we make our choices between them, some ideal is always butchered. “It is a tragic situation,” he notes, “and no mere speculative conundrum with which [we have] to deal.”6For James, the pinch is a constitutive feature of the world of action. Victories abound. But so do defeats. Every-where we look we see what he describes as “the struggle and the squeeze,” and our task is somehow to lessen them. In this effort, we do not have re-course to fixed principles or rules. In James’s words, “Every real dilemma is in literal strictness a unique situation; and the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals disappointed which each decision creates is always auniverse without a precedent, and for which no adequate previous rule exist.” 7At the moment of decision, we can only act on what we hold dear.

#### Only a pragmatist ethic can resolve the problem of evil by recognizing it as part of an uncertain world that we create through our actions

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (35-36) NP 3/3/17.

Dewey would disagree. Evils are scaled down in his naturalistic philosophy. They are desires errant and frustrated: simply part of the vicissitudes of existence. To be sure, evils remain a powerful force in our lives—thwarting our efforts and often making our lives miserable and painful—but they are not thought of as a defect and aberration, as deviations from the perfect. For Dewey, the recognition of uncertainty displaces the assumption of an antecedent identity between the actual and ideal, along with all of the problems, particularly the problem of evil, that follow from it. Dewey’s starting point, then, is quite different from Royce’s. It is not one in which the ideal is already and eternally a property of the real. Ideals in-stead signal the possibility of modifying the current state of affairs; they take us back to Dewey’s understanding of ideas as designations of operations and their consequences.58And as he put it in The Quest for Certainty, “The sense of incompetency and the sloth born of the desire for irresponsibility have combined to create an overwhelming longing for the ideal and rational as an antecedent possession for actuality, and consequently something upon which we can fall back for emotional support in times oftrouble.”59And, if that support fails us at the crucial moment, something to shake our fist at as we succumb to pessimism. The problem of evil, for Dewey, is not a theological or metaphysical problem. It “is perceived to be the practical problem of reducing, alleviating, as far as may be removing, the evils of life,” and the task of philosophy is to contribute “in however humble a way to methods that will assist us in discovering the causes of humanity’s ills.”60For Dewey, then, the world is neither wholly evil nor wholly good. It simply is what is, and our actions infuse it with meaning. Unlike Royce, Dewey does not begin with “bitter lament” over the “tragedy of brute chance.” He simply acknowledges uncertainty and all that attends it as the constitutive feature of the world of action, arguing that our task is to act in this world as intelligently as possible in order to secure some consequences and avoid others. This exposes us to the peril of evils. We may have experiences that make us “tremble through and through”—or even lead us to despair. But they would be experiences, not occasions for abstract lamentation over the failure of the universe. Not the result of ideals pitched too high, but moments of genuine defeat. Such moments concerned Dewey. He worried about despair, for he understood that to act is to risk defeat and that defeat can be debilitating. I read his passionate insistence on the need for critical intelligence as, at times, a desperate attempt to equip us with the tools to withstand such moments. Does this constitute an answer to Lincoln’s challenge? To my mind, yes. If we understand that the world of action involves us in the peril of evils and that democracy is a product of our making, then we must define democracy in relation to that world and the uncertainty that attends it. Our democratic way of life is by no means guaranteed, nor is it perfect. The perennial problems of racism reveal as much. Democracy must be understood, then, apart from procedures and laws and seen as a regulative ideal toward which we strive (with all of the risks that striving entails).61

#### Only a Deweyan notion of experience and philosophy renders the field relevant – the past is relevant to the present but does not count exclusively

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (83-85) NP 3/3/17.

John Dewey’s seminal essay “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” critiques not so much the failure of his age as the scholasticism and conservatism of professional philosophy.38 Dewey believes that modern philosophy suffers from cultural and social irrelevance because its major pre-occupation (securing the epistemological remedy to our subject-object ailments) yields bad ways of thinking about experience. Consequently, he believes, philosophy fails to speak to our everyday doings and sufferings. Dewey aims, then, to emancipate philosophy from a “too intimate and exclusive attachment to traditional problems” in order to make what philosophers do—that is, to envision, imagine, and reflect—useful in deal-ing with our problems. This may at first seem unrelated to the problem of history in black theology, but it is precisely in Dewey’s discussion of ex-perience, and the notion of contingency that it presupposes, that the idea of history serving us takes on added significance. As Dewey writes inDemocracy and Education: “Past events cannot be separated from the living present and retain meaning. The true starting point of history is always some present situation with its problems.”39Dewey contrasts traditional conceptions of experience with notions he views as more congenial to present conditions. In the views he dismisses, experience is regarded as, above all, concerned with knowledge, a psychical thing in which the past counts exclusively and reference to precedent is believed to be its essence. The empirical tradition, then, is committed to particularism. Connections and continuities are supposed to be foreign to experience, and experience and thought are antithetical terms.40 Each of these orthodox views of experience deepens the subject-object problematic at the heart of modern philosophy. Dewey responds by arguing that knowing can be properly understood only as a functional activity in the context of experience. We think or in-quire within experience, for inquiry arises as we encounter difficult problems or meddlesome circumstances. Understood in this way, experience includes both the act of experiencing and the experience, what William James referred to as the double-barreled sense of the word. “Like its congeners, life and history,” Dewey writes, “[experience] includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine—in short, processes ofexperiencing.”41As such, experience cannot be reduced to simply a psychical thing. The problem, then, is not whether there is epistemic justification for the existence of a world outside our ideas but, rather, how we go about dealing and coping intelligently with our environment.42For Dewey, such activity necessarily entails a degree of randomness, be-cause, as I suggested in chapter 1,“any reaction is a venture; it involves risk.” But to the extent that we generate the foresight to anticipate future consequences in our present doings and sufferings, we engage in intelligent activity. He therefore rejects the notion that “the past exclusively counts.” Experience, for Dewey, is prospective; it is as much about projection and anticipation as it is about recollection and memory. Dewey warns us to be suspicious of eulogistic predicates: invocations of permanence, essence, totality, verum et bonum, and the like lead to an artificial simplification of our lives.43Echoing in some ways Nietzsche, Dewey argues: “If[the past] were wholly gone and done with, there would be only one reasonable attitude towards it. Let the dead bury the dead.”44This connection to the future is the primary basis for critical intelligence—the primary basis, that is, for insisting on our active presence in the world. Critical intelligence is forward-looking, and only by ignoring this, Dewey argues, “does it become a mere means for an end already given. The latter is servile, even when the end is labeled moral, religious or esthetic.”45This prospective orientation presupposes that connections and relations are constitutive of our experiences and that we can infer from these experiences standards and norms that will help us in the future. In the orthodox view of experience, our doings and sufferings provide us no guidance for moral and social behavior. Dewey argues, however, that it is through critical examination of our experiences that we are able to articulate our obligations intelligently and to decide, without guarantee of success, what is best for us to do under specific circumstances. Let me quote in full a passage that, up to now, I have only referred to in fragments: Experience is primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing some-thing; of suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these words. The organism has to endure, to undergo, the consequences of its own actions. . . . Experience, in other words, is a matter of simultaneous doings and sufferings. Our undergoings are experiments in varying the course of events; our active tryings are trials and tests of ourselves.46What is interesting about Dewey’s conception of experience is not only his rejection of modern philosophy’s obsession with the “given,” but the role history assumes in our lives once we take his conception of experience seriously.

#### Individuals both act and are acted upon in a world that is neither fixed nor complete – this supports a pragmatic understanding of agency and human identity

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (94-96) NP 3/11/17.

Scott insists, and rightly so, that we remain mindful of the political dimensions of historical inquiry. Easy appeals to experience and the ostensibly self-evident identities of persons who have experiences short-circuit critical consideration of the political contexts that shape us and our world. This view seemingly locates politics elsewhere, and too often the result is bad descriptions that fail to reveal the complex ways in which identities are produced and how they operate. What is needed instead is a geneal-ogy (in Michel Foucault’s sense of the word) of experience. I am certainly sympathetic to Scott’s position. She rightly worries about characterizations of experience that fail to examine carefully the conditions that determine how experience relates to knowledge, presume a tendentious unity among members of a particular group (e.g., women, African Americans, or homosexuals), and insist that agency is an inherent attribute of individuals.9I hope I have demonstrated in the previous chap-ters that Dewey offers resources for thinking about experience that evadeseach of these concerns. His transactionalism insists on the relation of our actions with contexts that shape and impede or facilitate our efforts to secure desired ends. Appeals to experience in subaltern histories, then, do not settle matters by, say, evidencing the fact of difference; rather, experience constitutes the arena within which differences acquire salience and meaning. With this in mind, Dewey reconstructs what we mean by knowledge and insists that solidarities are made and remade in the context of problem-solving activity. Here, as I mentioned in chapter 1,knowledge is understood as the fruit of undertakings that seek to resolve problematic situations. It proceeds after the pattern provided by experimental inquiry, not upon the groundwork of ideas framed prior to our experience. Agencyremains. We are indeed constantly negotiating an environment that de-mands much of us, and it is in Dewey’s insistence that we do so intelli-gently that his pragmatism reveals its critical and moral imperative. Much hangs on what we mean by agency here. Scott and feminists like Judith Butler worry, among other things, that appeals to agency too often presume intention and motive as the source of our actions. Butler in par-ticular denies the fact of a rational agent antecedent to action (“an indi-vidual’s will or intention”), insisting instead that our choices “draw upon and reengage conventions which have gained their power precisely through a sedimented iterability.” Performative agency then marks the various ways our actions are simultaneously produced and constrained by linguistic processes. It is in light of this claim that Butler declares that “there is no opposition to power which is not itself part of the very work-ings of power . . . agency is implicated in what it opposes.”10I have grown a bit weary of this sort of claim. Admittedly, it acquires much of its own power in the context of those who would deny the in-sight—individuals committed to a certain version of a bourgeois liberal subject. But I believe one could concede the claim that opposition to power is implicated in the very workings of power without giving up too much or taking on the rather burdensome view of language Butler’s po-sition presupposes. Pragmatists, particularly Deweyan pragmatists, do not hold the view that a rational agent exists apart from experience. In fact, we have traded in a conception of rationality for that of intelligence, which involves directed attempts to secure certain aims and to avoid others. We understand that the goods we seek take on significance for us in light of the particular demands of our environment. Experience, rightly under-stood, avoids, then, the traps that a position like Butler’s aims to rectify. By my pragmatist lights, giving priority to experience signals a conception of agency profoundly implicated in the vicissitudes of life. Experienced situations are of two types: some take place with a minimum of regulation and foresight; others occur, in part, as the result of intelligent action. Both types are “had, undergone, enjoyed or suffered,” but they are distinguishable to the degree that the former reflect the dispensation of fortune or providence, while the latter constitute “the funded outcome of operations.” Intelligently guided action, then, reflects our efforts to modify our conditions of living within the context of a particular problem. Here Dewey rejects explicitly the view of mind as a spectator apart from the world, knowing “by means of an equipment of powers complete within itself, and merely exercised upon an antecedent external material equally complete in itself.” Instead, we find ourselves in the midst of indefinite interactions in a world that is neither fixed nor complete “but is capable of direction to new and different results through mediation of intentional operations.”11For Dewey action is an inherent part of what it means to be an organ-ism transacting with one’s environment. But action as such is not necessarily intelligent. This requires directed operations performed in the modification of conditions. In the end men do what they can do. They refrain from doing what they can-not do. They do what their own specific powers in conjunction with the lim-itations and resources of the environment permit. The effective control of their powers is not through precepts, but through the regulation of their conditions. If this regulation is to be not merely physical or coercive, but moral, it must consist of the intelligent selection and determination of the environments in which we act.12It is not enough, then, to assert the mere fact of human agency. Rather, we must insist on the necessity of intelligently guided action as we confront a precarious and unstable world. For Dewey, this precariousness—what I re-ferred to in chapter 1as contingency with tragic implications—is a necessary condition for freedom, in the sense that a world complete and exact offers no place for freedom.

#### Individual identity is constituted by experience and interaction with the external world – moral considerations arise in response to specific conditions

Rogers 2 summarizes Dewey, Melvin. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) *Liberalism, Narrative, and Identity: A Pragmatic Defense of Racial Solidarity*. 2002. NP 3/12/17.

The efficacy of the intentions and actions of individuals to which MacIntyre referred earlier is fundamental, but can now be specifically assessed by their ability to address, what Dewey often referred to as the problematic environment in experience. [29] Dewey develops his argument against the tendency to see moral choices as derivable from some fixed category in the mind. But this obscures, Dewey argues, the fact that our moral choices are largely made in response to problematic features of the setting in which we find ourselves. Questions of how we should treat individuals in a given situation, or how we come to have allegiances and loyalties to one group rather than another cannot, and are not often made sense of through species-wide arguments about rational communication and deliberative decision-making. Of course, pragmatists do not discount the importance of these elements, but they nonetheless believe that there are often socio-psychological elements that are central to such questions that help us to understand why one choice was made rather than another, and in assessing the resolving- capacity of the choice made. ￼20. Much like MacIntyre, for the pragmatists, to carry out an action is to achieve an end, but this action grows out of tensions, fractures, or pressures in experience. Inquiry that arises is always represented as a form of action that is concerned with "things to do or be done, judgments of a situation demanding" a response.[30] Reflection and inquiry thus develop out of immediate experience -- out of what is immediately suffered, possessed, enjoyed as good, bad and so on. George Herbert Mead characterizes it this way: "Reflection ... makes possible the purposive control and organization by the individual organism of its conduct with reference to its social and physical situations in which it becomes involved and to which it reacts." [31] This is not to say that each inquiry, for the pragmatist, always begins with immediate experience detached from all previous reflection. Rather, immediate experience is situated within, and rendered intelligible through the narrative structure of experience.[32] ￼￼￼21. This, then, tilts how we understand the most pressing moral issues that confront us in a different direction. For pragmatists, moral questions -- as for example, how we should distribute resources, how should we respond to discrimination -- are an outgrowth to the problems that we encounter not merely as private mental activity, but as social beings. The pragmatists, extending the Darwinian model of an organism engaging and adjusting to its environment, add to it a social dimension. On the pragmatists' view, the reproduction of a stable society is composed of multiple agents that confront a world that demand reflection, in moments of crisis and problems, upon their own reactive conduct. So for example, and as a prelude to section two, discriminatory practices still prevalent in the U.S. are specifically viewed by black agents as problematic environing conditions that demand adjustment or cultivation of responses. One such response is solidarity among similarly situated folk. In other words, the problems that attend social life are often experienced and responded to because individual narratives intersect and therefore allow for the identification of shared concerns. In such cases, should the response be collective action? Perhaps, but even that is itself a subject that can only be determined by the give and take element central to narrative. But this nonetheless means that the experience of social reality provides the "starting point and terminal point, [for] setting problems and [for] testing proposed solutions."[33] What is at issue in these instances is always the type of individuals we understand ourselves to be, will become, and the type of world we hope to create. The relationship between individuals and their external environment forms a permanent unity and therefore interpenetrate precisely because individuals are seeking moral and political diagnoses and prognoses to shape a better world for themselves and future generations.

## K stuff

#### Only a pragmatist account makes racial solidarity intelligible

Rogers 2, Melvin. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) *Liberalism, Narrative, and Identity: A Pragmatic Defense of Racial Solidarity*. 2002. NP 3/12/17.

Of course, the story Glaude renders is more complicated.[54] But for our purposes, the solidarity that Glaude describes displaces the outgrowth of obligation and solidarity from something fixed, to the dialogical relations among black subjects and their relations to the external environment that leads to their conjoint efforts. Solidarity, then, is conceived through an understanding of race as it locates itself in space and across the biographies of individuals who have the experience of being seen and treated in a certain way that leads not simply to a parallel among biographies, but an overlap. It is this overlap that creates forms of common **life and** a sense of what Wilfred Sellars refers to as "we-intentions" -- that is, a solidaristic orientation in response to shared problems.[55] This need not imply that all black persons would have had to actually experience racist practices in order to affirm solidaristic ties, since sociologists note that racist practices in the past and present become part of, and help form, group memory as they are reproduced across time through various institutions.[56] So for example, in speaking of the verdict in the Rodney King trial, an African American student says it "sends a very scary message to me . . . I can be driving my car and fitting a description. I try to respect cops as much as I can [but] I'm very scared that something like this could happen to me."[57] Glaude's study, as with the work of Dawson and others, show that racism is experienced as a problem, and so provides the starting point against which black Americans attempt to assess appropriate responses. We must be careful how we read this claim. On one level, the response to continued practices of discrimination eventuates in solidarity itself. It does not come prior to the dialogical features of social relations, but rather is an outgrowth of the process itself. This point is important, since I deny that my argument commits us to believing that the notion of common problems are not themselves forged through discussion. We engage in debate, discussion, and critique about society that helps make sense of what we share, and this in turn fosters solidarity.[58] On another level, solidarity orients action thereafter since it demands a response above and beyond simply organizing.[59] ￼￼35. We can make sense of the point from another, more extended, angle. To be sure, not all features of reality present themselves as problems and, for the most part, our actions both with respect to others and the external world proceed routinely. This ability to sustain routines, out of which norms and habits develop, is essential in understanding our individual biographies. This gives us a sense of stability, and we can reflexively grasp our identity in light of this fact. If asked to give an account of why I did something which I do everyday routinely, I can begin to bring the motivational features that are the source of the action to the fore. More strikingly, however, is that there are moments when the routines in life are disrupted, bringing to the foreground (while consigning other features to the background) those elements of our identities that are called into question by the disruption. The history of race as a category of identification makes it just this sort of feature of identity that is called into the foreground when black individuals encounter racial discrimination either in day-to-day practices or from an institutional perspective.[60] It is the day-to-day practices or the workings of institutions that cast the actions of black subjects into greater relief. Thus the understanding of black subjects' actions must take its point of departure from an examination of the external world that stimulated the longing for, and efforts at achieving a changed environment. 36. ￼Here, too, racial solidarity becomes intelligible. It constitutes a dialogue in which individual black agents assign value to their experience as subjects of oppression and discrimination in order to support affirmation of solidaristic ties. Consider, for a moment, the utterance in a debate over group-based representation: "I am a black American, and as such I feel that my interests will be best served by people like myself." Now there are a number of ways we can read this claim. "Like myself," for example could refer to others who are of the same socio-economic status or sexual orientation. But if so, the claim would usually be modified differently by another ascriptive feature of identity such as "middle-class" or "gay." Rather, "black American" is a stand-alone phrase in this utterance, qualifying the latter part of the sentence in a specific way. The term "black American" in this instance is doing a great deal of ethical work; it is drawing our attention backward, as it were, to the larger horizon of experiences that called forth the salience of the term, and forward as to our future orientation. We would miss the force of the utterance if we interpreted it along individualistic lines. What may appear to be a "form of individualism," to borrow from Glaude, "gives way to a communitarian ethic: our duty is not only to ourselves but to the well-being of the community of those like us."[61]

#### Commitment to pragmatist methodology is necessary to confront racism and remain committed to overcoming it

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (ix-xii) NP 2/26/17.

Preface “Knowledge is power,” declared a young African American man attend-ing the Tavis Smiley Foundation Leadership Institute. The institute was founded to train young people between the ages of thirteen and eighteen to become leaders in their communities. They learn how to take stock of their strengths and weaknesses, to lay plans and set goals, to communicate effectively and build networks. They also learn how to apply these skills to make successful lives for themselves and, ideally, to bring about change in their communities. I was able to spend some time with these remarkable young people in the summer of2006at Texas Southern University. Cornel West, Tavis Smiley, and I held a town-hall meeting to discuss with them The Covenant with Black America, Smiley’s best-selling book on the current conditions of African Americans, and its relevance to their ambitions as future leaders. The young man who spoke was obviously excited about the occasion, and so were we. He went on to say with profound conviction, “I will do everything in my power to continue to get knowledge.” Another young man stood up and offered a slight correction to his col-league’s impassioned remarks. He said, “I agree with what has just been said, but we should know that knowledge without action is useless. We must do something with that knowledge.” The conversation that followed was instructive. Students weighed in on the matter. West and Smiley offered their views. I asked, “What if we understand knowledge not as separate from doing, but rather as a consequence of it? What if knowledge is simply the fruit of our undertakings?” To use one of Tavis Smiley’s favorite words, we proceeded to “marinate” for a while on the implications of the relation between how we think and how we act. At one level, my questions had been aimed simply at countering an implicit anti-intellectualism. But what I had also done was to invoke, verbatim, John Dewey’s definition of knowledge as the “fruit of our undertakings.” In a room full of young people with varied backgrounds and challenges in their lives, we found ourselves thinking with distinctly pragmatic tools about epistemology and how our thoughts about the subject could affect how we seek to change the world. Why John Dewey in this context? Because I believe that the tradition of American pragmatism exemplified by Dewey offers powerful resources for redefining African American leadership and politics. This book seeks to make that case. I argue that pragmatism, when attentive to the darker dimensions of human living (what we often speak of as the blues), can address many of the conceptual problems that plague contemporary African American political life. How we think about black identity, how we imagine black history, and how we conceive of black agency can be rendered in ways that escape bad racial reasoning—reasoning that assumes a tendentious unity among African Americans simply because they are black, or that short-circuits imaginative responses to problems confronting actual black people. The relationship I propose between pragmatism and African American politics is mutually beneficial. Pragmatism must reckon with the blues or remain a stale academic exercise. The blues, of course, are much more than a musical idiom. They constitute, as Albert Murray notes in his classic book on the subject, “a statement about confronting the complexities inherent in the human situation and about improvising or experimenting or riffing or otherwise playing with (or even gambling with) such possibilities as are inherent in the obstacles, the disjunctures, and the jeopardy.” Murray goes on to say, in words that I hope will resonate through the pages that follow, that the blues are “a statement about perseverance and about resilience and thus also about the maintenance of equilibrium de-spite precarious circumstances and about achieving elegance in the very process of coping with the rudiments of subsistence.”1In one sense, to take up the subject of African American politics is inevitably to take up the blues. That is to say, the subject cannot but account for the incredible efforts of ordinary black folk to persevere with elegance and a smile as they confront a world fraught with danger and tragedy. To embrace pragmatism is to hold close a fundamental faith in the capacities of ordinary people to transform their circumstances while rejecting hidden and not-so-hidden assumptions that would deny them that capacity. To bind pragmatism and African American politics together, I hope to show, is to open up new avenues for thinking about both. My book does not offer a political blueprint nor is it concerned with putting forward concrete solutions to specific political problems. It seeks instead to open up deliberative space within African American communities and throughout the country for reflection on how we think about the pressing matters confronting black communities and our nation. Reflection is not opposed to action. I hope to make clear how the theoretical and the practical are intimately connected. To be sure, the bleak realities of our country constitute the backdrop of my efforts. Our democratic way of life is in jeopardy. Fear and our clam-oring need for security have revealed the more unsavory features of American culture. The foundational elements of a free and open society are be-ing eroded, and our political leaders lie to justify their destruction. The corrosive effects of corporate greed on the form and content of our democ-racy are also apparent: the top 1percent of the population is getting richer while the vast majority of Americans, of whatever color, struggle to make ends meet. In many African American communities in particular, we see the signs of crisis: deteriorating health, alarming rates of incarceration, the devastating effects of drug economies, and the hyper concentration of poverty because work has simply disappeared. Political factions stay the course, exploiting faith communities, stoking the fires of homophobia (while denying the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in black communities), and appealing to uncritical views of black solidarity that often blind our fellow citizens to the destructive policies that, ultimately, undermine the values of democratic life. All the while, established African American leaders seem caught in a time warp in which the black revolu-tion of the 1960s is the only frame of reference, obscuring their ability tosee clearly the distinctive challenges of our current moment. In dark and trying times, particularly in democracies, it is incumbent upon citizens to engage one another in order to imagine possibilities and to see beyond the recalcitrance of their condition. Participatory democracies are always fragile, and moments of crisis serve as easy excuses to discard the values that sustain them. When we stop talking with and provoking our fellows we in effect cede our democratic form of life to those forces that would destroy it. In a Shade of Blueseeks, among other things,to make explicit the values and commitments that inform my own think-ing about African American politics and democratic life. The book con-tinuously asserts the primacy of participatory democracy, the necessity for responsibility and accountability, and the pressing need for more imaginative thinking about African American conditions of living. For me, these are not abstract concerns. I have been blessed over the last couple of years to be able to speak all around the country and talk with fel-low citizens about the challenges confronting African American commu-nities specifically and our democratic form of life generally. On college campuses from New Haven to Denver to Urbana, and in town-hall meet-ings from Oakland to Houston, I have invoked my pragmatic commit-ments as a basis for reimagining African American politics—to reject specious conceptions of black identity, facile formulations of black history, and easy appeals to black agency. I have insisted that we hold one another accountable and responsible in light of an understanding that democracy is a way of life and not merely a set of procedures—that it involves a cer-tain moral and ethical stance and requires a particular kind of disposition committed to the cognitive virtues of free and open debate. I have urged young African Americans to take up the challenge to forge a politics thatspeaks to the particular problems of this moment and not simply tomimic the strategies and approaches of the black freedom struggle of the1960s. I have done so because of my philosophical commitment to the idea that publics come into and out of existence all the time and that our chal-lenge is to find the requisite tools to respond to the shifts and transfor-mations that call new publics into being.

#### Only the pragmatist ethic can account for the uncertainty of the external world

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (22-24) NP 2/26/17.

Why? The world of action, of doing and making, involves us in activities that in no way remove uncertainty. As Dewey writes: “The distinctive characteristic of practical activity, one which is so inherent that it cannot e eliminated, is the uncertainty that attends it. Of it we are compelled to say: Act, but act at your peril.”13Practical activity involves change, and it has been our desire to escape the frightening consequences of change that has led to misguided quests for certainty. In Dewey’s view, modern philosophy has conceived of knowledge, for example, as a private affair in which the disclosure of the invariant—the Real in itself—is the object of inquiry. Here philosophers strip away the imaginative formulations of a religious outlook, in which a sharp division between the ordinary and the extraordinary animates how we see ourselves in relation to our world and the universe, only to replace them with their own doctrine of what Dewey termed “the antecedently real,” which when grasped by thought, discloses fixed and immutable Truth. For Dewey, this search translates efforts to es-cape the exigencies of life into rational form. Deliverance from the vicissitudes of existence by means of rites and sacrifice gives way to a form of deliverance through reason, a theoretical affair that stands apart from our actual conditions of living.14The world of action, by contrast, is fraught with uncertainty. In it, events for which we have neither wished nor planned happen to us and transform our lives. Circumstances may force us to choose wrongly or to betray those whom we love. People we cherish die. We die. Indeed, the contingency of our lives and the apparent indifference of nature to our efforts jeopardize human aspirations to live good lives.15Deliverance from the exigencies of life is, in some ways, deliverance from what some take to be the tragedy of brute chance. For in the end, Dewey writes, “the quest for certainty is a quest for peace which is assured, an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action casts. For it is not uncertainty per se which men dislike, but the fact that uncertainty involves us in peril of evils.”16This understanding of contingency forms the background for Dewey’s philosophical formulations; it extends the Darwinian outlook, which pre-supposes that the world is processive. Dewey believes that Darwinian evolution dislodged an Aristolelian conception of the world in which all changes reflected an overarching order and were cumulative, in the sense that they tended in a predetermined direction.17Darwin’s influence on philosophy resided in his rejection of this particular view and its replacement by the principle of transition: that the environment exerts pressures on its inhabitants and that random variations among these living creatures affect how they will get on in the environment as it acts upon them. Our activity in the world, then, is one of constant adaptation and adjustment in light of the limit conditions of existence. Three crucial points for Dewey’s philosophy follow from this principle:(1) that philosophy must give up inquiry after absolute origins and fixed. Truth and turn its attention to the actual conditions of experience that generate specific values, (2) that philosophy must abandon efforts to prove that life must have certain qualities and values, over and beyond experi-ence, because of some predetermined end, and (3) that such an outlook introduces responsibility into intellectual life. We must, in Dewey’s view, look the facts of experience in the face, acknowledging both the evils they present and the goods they may promise. As Dewey writes: As long as mankind suffered from this impotency, it naturally shifted a bur-den of responsibility that it could not carry over to the more competent shoulders of the transcendent cause. But if insight into specific conditions of value and into specific consequences of idea is possible, philosophy must in time become a method of locating and interpreting the more serious con-flicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis.18The quest for certainty, then, is seen for what it is: an effort on the part of fragile, finite creatures to secure themselves and their world in the face of unrelenting change. Such efforts have led us to turn our backs on the world of action and, to some extent, to absolve ourselves of the strenuous work of “making and remaking” our world. Fixed reality, complete in itself, provides us with a sense of assurance that order stands behind what we experience as con-tingent. It is similar to the relief from grief we feel when we know that ourloved ones are resting peacefully in heaven. But Darwin’s insights, Dewey maintains, force us to reject this view. Disclosure of the antecedently real does nothing to arrest the changes in our world (just as knowing that our loved ones are in heaven does not change the fact that they are dead and no longer with us). Change still happens—for better or for worse. If we turn instead to experience, we give up efforts to secure our world by means of transcending it. The search for security remains. Our efforts, however, are located in practical activity, not in quests for absolute certainty. In this view, knowledge is the fruit of our attempts to resolve problematic situations and is understood in the context of communal inquiry, not in terms of private mental activity. The turn to the actual conditions of our living, then, tilts our understanding of knowledge in a different di-rection. It is no longer about absolute certainty and fixed Truth. Instead, knowledge can be properly understood only as a functional activity in the context of our experience, that is to say, in the context of interactions with our environment. The qualities and values of these experiences are not predetermined and set. Nor are they reducible to an inner event orto a backward-looking affair in which the past counts exclusively. Expe-rience, for Dewey, “is a matter of simultaneous doings and sufferings,”19aprocess of undergoing in which agent-patients seek experimentally to find the best tools to cope with the obstacles their environment presents and to anticipate future problems.

#### We must shift away from traditional metaphysics that treat abstract ideals as a retreat from actuality -- pragmatist’s appreciation of the importance of context lets us focus on the particularity of injustice

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (25-26) NP 3/3/17.

Contingency forms the backdrop for Dewey’s philosophical reflection. Once we grasp its place in his overall outlook we get a sense of his view of human agency and the task of philosophy. That is to say, once we realize that there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had for our beliefs, we can give up efforts to discover the antecedently real and realize that what human beings do in the face of problems and how they go about doing it is the primary topic of philosophical reflection. Questions like Is the universe friendly to democratic possibility? can be abandoned. Instead we will ask how the consequences of our choices serve or defeat our efforts for genuine democratic living. The shift, as Dewey puts it, is “from an intelli-gence that shaped things once for all to the particular intelligences which things are even now shaping.”22It is essential that we recognize that, even with all Dewey’s talk about intelligent action, uncertainty remains. Action involves risks and by no means guarantees satisfactory outcomes. Dewey makes this point power-fully near the end of his Gifford Lectures: At best, all our endeavors look to the future and never attain certainty. The lesson of probability holds for all forms of activity as truly as for the experimental operations of science and even more poignantly and tragically. The control and regulation of which so much has been said never signifies cer-tainty of outcome, although the greater need of security it may afford will not be known until we try the experimental policy in all walks of life. The un-known surrounds us in other forms of practical activity even more than in knowing, for they reach further in the future, in more significant and less controllable ways. A sense of dependence is quickened by that Copernican revolution which looks to security amid change instead of to certainty in attachment to the fixed.23 Dewey suggests here that our immodest pains to uncover the fixed and immutable principles of the universe provide a level of comfort (assurance) that is not available once we turn to the world of action. This world forces us to humble our efforts to the work of hypotheses for the amelioration of individual and social problems. We stand unprotected by the armor of traditional metaphysics only to encounter the full brunt of change and its potential misery and joy. Our best recourse in the face of these moments is not to seek refuge from the troubles of existence24but rather to act as intelligently as possible to secure for ourselves what we deem, at a given moment, desirable. The problems of evil then are understood, for Dewey, within the stream of experiences, and we need only turn to his conception of moral experience to see their tragic dimensions and implications. Our moral experiences are characterized by conflicting moral de-mands.25We confront situations that demand of us a choice between competing values, and the conflict produces a genuine moral dilemma. Moral experiences and deliberation, then, are always situated in the context of some particular problem—some perceived moral perplexity. For Dewey, there are at least two kinds of moral struggle. One, which is most often emphasized in traditional moral writings, is the case when an individual is tempted to do something she knows is wrong. Dewey uses the example of the bank employee who is tempted to embezzle money. She knows that she shouldn’t, though she may try to convince herself otherwise, to permit her desires to govern her beliefs. No real thinking, however, takes place, even if she seeks to justify embezzlement, for there is no sincere doubt as to what should be done.26

#### A pragmatic understanding gives us the tools to understand tragic choices created as a product of racism in America

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (45-46) NP 3/3/17.

I have argued in this chapter that John Dewey’s philosophy presupposes a tragic vision and that a pragmatic view of tragedy is one in which any sit-uation properly called moral entails competing and conflicting values. Dewey sees conflict and uncertainty as constitutive and ineliminable features of our moral experience. For him, there are no guaranteed outcomes when we choose between conflicting values. We learn from tragedy that crude reductions of the complexity of our moral lives can lead to an exclusive attachment to one value and disregard for another.77 Dewey, by contrast, commends a process of intelligently guided experimentation in a world we acknowledge is shot through with contingency. We seek to secure our world, then, not by way of quests for certainty but rather by practical means, exposing our vulnerability as fragile, finite creatures to the perils of evil. To render Dewey’s philosophy of action in slogan like form: There is so much in the world that we cannot control. We should seek to control intelligently that which we can, bearing in mind that even when we succeed, the hazardous character of our world is only modestly modified, never eliminated. Intelligence, in this view, must be understood within the context of a generally humble orientation to the universe. In relation to all that is, we are small and our world is far from grand. Yet Dewey failed to address the evils of white supremacy in his work. To be sure, his influence looms large among African Americans who have struggled to end racism in the United States.78 But he himself never substantively engaged the problems of racism in any of his major work. Such an engagement would not only have offered powerful resources for thinking about certain conceptual problems plaguing African American politics but would also have made explicit the tragic dimensions of American pragmatism. My reading of Toni Morrison’s Beloved is an attempt to re-construct a pragmatic view of the tragic in light of the devastating effects of white supremacy that continue to haunt American democracy. Slave narratives sought melodramatically to disclose the evil at the heart of American democracy. Morrison’s reconstruction of those stories provides a glimpse into the tragic choices made and the consequences endured in the face of that evil. The tragic choices that we as a nation have made in regard to race—the butchering of precious ideals, as William James putit—have, ironically, made possible our present way of life. The knowledge that we gain from America’s past can, however, equip us to engage intelligently the problems that prevent democracy’s realization. By countering immodest claims of America’s greatness and inevitable triumph with the brutal reality of broken black bodies and souls, that past, in all of its complicated beauty, humbly orients us to the world of action. Beloved is a story which insists that our reflections on the future of American democracy begin with the remarkable irony at its root. For me, this is the lesson the novel renders to Dewey and to pragmatism generally: if we are to think se-riously about American democracy, we must come to terms with the tragedy of race and how it has shaped not only the life of the nation but also the choices of a blues people so deeply shaped by it. It is to those choices, so indelibly marked by quests for certainty and security amid the brutality of others, that I now turn.

#### The pragmatist view of identity that sees ourselves as constantly evolving and becoming through action = good//a static conception of blackness fails

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The pragmatic view of identity does not hold that identity is about discovery. Rather, identities are seen as consequences of human activity—specifically, our problem-solving activity.15In this view, character and conduct are interrelated and mutually dependent. The self is not some stable, un-changing frame of reference; rather, it is an organization of habits that is relatively stable and enduring. These habits—formed, at least in part, from previous experiences and always subject to modification as we act—constitute our character.16Or, as Dewey writes, “Character is the interpenetration of habits. If each habit existed in an insulated compartment and operated without affecting or being affected by others, character would not exist.”17 No self stands still; it is, for better or worse, constantly be-coming, and “it is in the quality of that becoming that virtue resides.”18 Moreover, our understanding of the beliefs, choices, and actions that rely on these habits arises in the context of bringing these experiences to consciousness in narrative—the history of the self. What we have done and are doing, and the stories we weave about these experiences, are absolutely critical for a pragmatic view of black identity. Unlike Tommie Shelby, I do not deny the relevance or centrality of black identity to black political struggle. Shelby argues powerfully in We Who Are Dark for a position he calls pragmatic black nationalism—“the view that black solidarity is merely a contingent strategy for creating freedom and social equality for blacks, a pragmatic yet principled approach to achieve racial justice.”19In making his argument, Shelby rejects a standard claim that African American politics requires, if it is to be successful, a notion of collective identity. He notes that such views often result in a reification of race and a conception of black life that obscures relevant differences among African Americans and frustrates individual freedom. In his view, the shared experiences of antiblack racism are sufficient for our efforts to secure racial justice. Black identity talk is simply not necessary. But Shelby fails to take seriously what a pragmatic view of black identity might suggest. The term pragmatic, as he uses it, seems to have only heuristic value and not to refer to a set of philosophical commitments. Shelby would have us believe that our identities are not particularly relevant to how we engage in struggles for racial justice. But if identities are the products of our efforts to overcome problems, then the content and consequences of our efforts impact the content of our character. We need not discard identity talk, then, but simply to reconstruct the term in light of our pragmatic commitments. The kinds of dispositions requisite for the kind of society both of us desire are, in part, formed in the context of political struggles. To the extent that character and conduct are intimately interrelated and mutually dependent, identities matter. The problem is with a certain view of collective identity, one that Shelby puts for-ward and rightly distrusts. This view motivates political practices and justifies political choices on the basis, more often than not, of an already fixed conception of black identity. But individual and collective identity can be thought of differently. Black identities and the identities of those who struggle for racial justice are as much the products of principled struggle as they are the motivation for that struggle. Who we take our-selves to be—that is, how we understand ourselves as moral agents—often guides how we engage in politics, and the sorts of choices we make while engaging in politics fundamentally shape who we take ourselves to be. Identity talk matters, then, because of its ethical and moral implications for and beyond politics.

#### Understanding of our identity as fixed fails – rather, we shape and are shaped by the world, making it imperative to focus on the specificities and particularities of problems

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (59-60) NP 3/3/17.

Black identities emerge within complexly organized interactions. They result, in part, from efforts to respond to a world that continually exacts choices from us, not from appeals to an idea of the self that exists outside the vagaries of human activity. Nor does moral obligation proceed from non empirical principles. A pragmatic understanding of black identity, then, shifts the way we think about our moral obligation to “the race.” I am well aware that our identities are shaped, in part, by a past and a set of stories in which our individual actions have had little say. But as Dewey writes in his Ethics: “Except as the outcome of arrested development, there is no such thing as a fixed, ready-made, finished self. Every living self causes acts and is itself caused in return by what it does. All voluntary action is a remaking of self, since it creates new desires, instigates new modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions which institute new ends.”24I do not take Dewey to be denying the idea of continuity be-tween who we take ourselves to be in time A as opposed to time B, for the stories we weave about our choices and beliefs, our pains and joys, provide a semblance of continuity. As he writes, “Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous development which binds together thesechanges.”25 Any notion of black identity, then, must be understood within the social contexts in which individuals who view themselves as black act. Obligations are also forged in the context of our doings and sufferings as we come to understand our relation to others. The pragmatic historicist view, however, denies the legitimacy of claims that black people are morally obligated to one another simply because they are black. This seems an indefensible position, based on specious racial reasoning, which inevitably fails to throw us back into the world of experience. Moreover, easy appeals to racial solidarity often obscure the hard work required to mobilize actual individuals to redress perceived wrongs. The pragmatic view of black identity instead understands moral obligation in terms of we-intentions; in our efforts to secure some consequences and avoid others we develop a sense that some other person is one of us (not, that is, one of “them,” who support a society premised on white supremacist practices). Such obligations do not proceed from some mystical idea of black solidarity or belonging but, rather, reflect efforts to secure some consequences and avoid others. These efforts often involve conjoint activity. We join with others who face similar unjust treatment (or who do not face such treatment but are nevertheless committed to justice), and we resist that treatment together.26What is striking about this formulation is that it is thoroughly embedded in the world of action. Here ideas of racial solidarity and obligation are not predicated on some conception of blackness that hovers above the messiness of our living. Instead, the varied (racial) problems of our way of life result in the strategic subordination of differences in relation to the commonality of particular problems. We find ourselves at given moments speaking to the fact that we are black (a fact that has resulted in a certain kind of treatment) as opposed to our many other identities (being a woman, poor, gay, etc.). The pragmatic view of black identity holds, then, that racial solidarity and obligation are local, in the sense that both, like identity talk in general, are bound up in the context in which they take form. Our ability to distinguish that specificity (or context) determines, to some degree, the effectiveness of efforts to respond to the problem faced. In other words, our diagnosis of the problem guides the direction of our response.

#### Pragmatism provides an account of racial solidarity and individual identity that accounts for particularity

Rogers 2, Melvin. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) *Liberalism, Narrative, and Identity: A Pragmatic Defense of Racial Solidarity*. 2002. NP 3/12/17.

The discussion above yields three important conclusions. The first of these is that narrative theory wedded to pragmatism reveals that the lives of social beings are inherently storied, and that an appropriate attentiveness to the contextual horizon in which life unfolds provide the starting point for rendering and assessing identity construction, but more importantly moral choices as response to environing conditions intelligible. Thus people are partly guided to act in specific ways, whether individually or collectively, based on the pressures and tensions they experience in the world. Secondly, this foregoing account allows us to see racial solidarity as the outgrowth of problem- solving activity. This unhinges racial solidarity from any essentialist moorings, allowing for critique and evaluation. This suggests a more publicist orientation to racial solidarity. And third, sections one and two thus dovetail with the move to reintroduce excluded categories such as race into accounts of the foundations and scope of democracy. What this argument will ultimately mean depends on its ability to reorient the reflections of individuals regarding the sources of our loyalties and allegiances, why they come to have the weight they do, and what they indicate about the strengths and weaknesses of our democracy. For in the final analysis, what philosophical reflection reveals to individuals is important; it attempts to expand our conceptual vocabulary or contract it with the hopes that the effort may make action more intelligent.

# Democracy as a political methodology

#### Abstract understandings of democratic life lead to despair about the world and undermine the notion of agency

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (38-39) NP 3/3/17.

I am sure West would claim that such a move does not speak to the in-dividual struggle with disease and death—that the shudder evidenced inRoyce’s solitary moment is missing here. I will bracket my concerns about the existentialist overtones of West’s objection only to make this point: that moving to the more abstract level does little to secure democratic forms of life and, more importantly, threatens those who ask such questions with debilitating despair or a sense of helplessness precisely because the alternatives they make available force us, in some way, to turn our backs on this world.67We then either give up on the possibility of our ac-tions’ effecting any significant change or we look to some other force that will, in the end, save us from ourselves. In the latter case, those of us con-cerned with bringing about radical democratic change must remember Dewey’s admonition: “[ We] will have to ask, as far as [we] nominally believe in the need for radical social change, whether what [we] accom-plish when [we] point with one hand to the seriousness of present evils APA (American Psychological Assoc.) Glaude, E. S. (2007). In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. MLA (Modern Language Assoc.) Glaude, Eddie S. In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost.

#### Democracy is the actualization of pragmatist epistemology

Shook 12, John R. (PhD, is Director of Education and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, N.Y.; he has been Research Associate in Philosophy at the University at Buffalo since 2006. Among his authored and edited books are Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism (2003), A Companion to Pragmatism (2005), Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers (2005), and The Future of Naturalism (2009).) *Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Public Democracy.* 2012. NP 3/11/17.

Pragmatists such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty defended the idea that public democracies are pragmatic theories in action, in two major senses. First, public democracy is a proposed method of social inquiry. When educated and communicating citizens make intelligent inquiries into their social conditions and changes to society, they are in a position to learn about how their society functions and how it can function differently. Democracy can produce social knowledge. Second, public democracy is itself an experimental test of the political proposition that citizens become more powerful over the conditions of life if their society becomes more and more democratic. Democracy can produce freer citizens. Pragmatism is demonstrably false if public democracy fails to increase social knowledge and fails to produce freer citizens. These two pragmatic tests of pragmatism are made in the actual experiments of free public democracy, in the same way that pragmatism is tested through the actual successes of free scientific inquiry into nature. During the twentieth century, cultural pluralism and especially race pluralism challenged pragmatism to prove its value for democracy in practice. 4

#### A pragmatist account is the only way to account for pluralism while avoiding essentialism that deprives minorities of agency

Shook 12, John R. (PhD, is Director of Education and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, N.Y.; he has been Research Associate in Philosophy at the University at Buffalo since 2006. Among his authored and edited books are Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism (2003), A Companion to Pragmatism (2005), Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers (2005), and The Future of Naturalism (2009).) *Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Public Democracy.* 2012. NP 3/11/17.

This experiential logic of cultural pluralism that inspires Du Bois’s thought is heard in additional pragmatist voices familiar during that era; from Jane Addams and Horace Kallen to Alain Locke and Randolph Bourne. Behind these voices are their teachers, William James, Josiah Royce, and John Dewey, who forged pluralistic sociologies and metaphysics using the insights of Hegelian historicism and philosophy of consciousness and freedom, Humboldt’s “holistic individualism,” Herder’s notion of a folk “cultural genius,” and nascent cultural anthropology advocated by Franz Boas enlightened by Darwin’s theory of statistical drift of all populations over time. The ethos of cultural pluralism translates into the pragmatic politics of a pluralistic democracy. This pluralistic democracy is not any sort of simplistic “multi”-culturalism, as if a democratic society were decomposable into distinct subgroups having no overlap and little in common with each other. The logic of cultural pluralism is not predicated on any deep essential commonality within every member of a group—rather, the people themselves, in their choices of social interactions and sharing experiences, create and compose a group. Because people are busily choosing their social interactions, within prevailing conditions of opportunity, there is no definite cultural boundary at the thin edges where overlap with other groups dominates, and any thick central aspect only constantly shifts over time. 16 Can a mass of people having only diverse plural interrelationships over time sustain the sort of social solidarity and force needed for democratic activism? It can seem much easier to assume a cultural essentialism grounding a group. However, cultural essentialism is internally self-contradictory, by promising greater power at the price of sacrificing freedom. This trade-off runs counter to the basic principles of democracy, which promise greater power through greater freedom. 17 Cultural essentialism differs from cultural pluralism by restricting a group’s membership to only those who entirely participate in exclusively one culture. Multiculturalism is notoriously torn between two rival versions, two logically extreme versions: a multiculturalism of mutually exclusive groups contained like marbles within one jar of society, or a multiculturalism of partially interpenetrating, overlapping, and constantly shifting groups composing society. The choice between an essentialist multiculturalism or a diffuse multiculturalism is not merely a theoretical choice between abstract visions of pluralism. The practical choice, the political choice, can be determined in favor of essentialist multiculturalism because it can supply strong, stable, and strident political strength for a group, if the group will pull together. Yet logic is not desire. What motivates a multitude, a potential group, to pull together and to unite under a single culture? 18 This problem of motivation cannot be solved by any kind of essentialism. Any suggested source of this needed motivation only fallaciously presupposes the prior existence of the unified group. In the face of possible extinction, essentialism dogmatically emphasizes the unrelenting peril of harsh racism and rigidly defines who is necessarily a group member, tempting cultural essentialism to mutate back into segregationalism, nationalism, militancy, and even biological racism again. This is the first paradox of essentialist power: any actual success in moderating racism only diminishes and weakens the group. It remains a social fact that a group’s magnitude and strength must naturally be proportional to the actual dedicated energy of its constituent members. For cultural essentialism, people get categorized first and their presumed dedication and energy to their assigned group are assumed to automatically follow. The second paradox of essentialist power has also been so widely noticed that we only need to mention it here: people within essentialist cultural groups are expected to be so tightly bound to that culture’s one way of life that freedoms to communicate and associate with other groups are strictly limited or even forbidden. The strength of the essentialist group is inversely proportional, in theory, to the personal liberties of its members; the stronger the group, the weaker any individual member. 19 There is a different understanding of social forces, a pragmatist understanding of the strength of unifying and unified social groups, that does not result in these twin essentialist paradoxes. This pragmatist understanding of social force does not dictate to people who they really must be, but only reminds people of who they are freely trying to be. If there is black power, for example, it exists in the lives of actual blacks living their lives in America. We have heard Du Bois’s eloquent call for American blacks to forge better and truer selves in the lived experience of shared opportunity. Alain Locke, the black philosopher at Howard University who also studied at Harvard with William James and Josiah Royce, similarly regarded race as a social definition and viewed culture as something created anew in experience. Locke states that “We must consider race not in the fascist, blood-clan sense, which also is tribal and fetishist, but consider race as a common culture and brotherhood.” (Harris 197-198) 20 For Locke, as for Du Bois, any genuinely pluralistic society must be composed of pluralistic individuals—pluralism and diversity must go all the way down to psychology and motivation. Locke’s celebration of The New Negro (Locke) in 1925 proceeds from this sort of diffuse pluralism, as does his 1942 essay “Who and What is Negro?” in which he says, “There is, in brief, no ‘The Negro’.” (Harris 210; Harris and Molesworth) If yet another first-rank intellectual should be called forth in support of diffuse multiculturalism, we may invoke Martin Luther King, Jr. King was also steeped in the Hegelian and pragmatic pluralism of the Boston personalists (Deats & Robb) and he borrowed the phrase “Beloved Community” from Royce. In Stride Toward Freedom, King says that Hegel’s analysis of the dialectical process taught him that “Growth comes through struggle.” In his book Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos Or Community? King writes, 21 The Negro is the child of two cultures—Africa and America. The problem is that in the search for wholeness all too many Negroes seek to embrace only one side of their natures. Some, seeking to reject their heritage, are ashamed of their color, ashamed of black art and music, and determine what is beautiful and good by the standards of white society. They end up frustrated and without cultural roots. Others seek to reject everything American and to identify totally with Africa, even to the point of wearing African clothes. But this approach leads also to frustration because the American Negro is not an African. The old Hegelian synthesis still offers the best answer to many of life’s dilemmas. The American Negro is neither totally African nor totally western. He is Afro-American, a true hybrid, a combination of two cultures. (King 588) 22 The Hegelian synthesis mentioned by King is a social synthesis of strength through shared experience. The bloodless dialectic of Hegelian categories is alive in the dynamic interactions among shifting social groups. 23

#### Deliberative democracy is the actualization of pragmatist principles

Rogers 2, Melvin. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) *Liberalism, Narrative, and Identity: A Pragmatic Defense of Racial Solidarity*. 2002. NP 3/12/17.

To begin, deliberative democracy acts both as a device for achieving political justification and a problem-solving mechanism. It aims at justification because it demands, as Joshua Cohen argues, that the legitimacy of the "terms and conditions of association proceed through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens."[70] But it is simultaneously a problem-solving activity to the extent that deliberation in public forums is context specific; it grows out of problems or tensions that develop in the course of collective organization that demand citizens to reason dialogically as to possible solutions.[71] The product of deliberation is registered directly or through legislative representatives, and this in turn connects deliberation to actual legislative institutions that can produce change. It places emphasis on equality, the freedom of individuals from coercion, and publicity. Although this last feature has been the source of disagreement, for our purposes it means that reasons offered in the public sphere regarding proposals must be accessible by the audience to which it is addressed.[72] So political institutions in the U.S. that foster structures that support free and public deliberation can be understood, on one level, as more or less legitimate to that extent. I say "on one level" since deliberative democrats wish to say something substantive about the legitimacy of deliberation that accrue to the outcome rather than the procedure itself. So the system is never legitimate so long as the procedure is fair, but must also be assessed by its ability to extend more substantive goods such as equality of opportunity. ￼￼￼45. This should immediately draw us to our previous discussion relating to reciprocal accountability. But it is important to see that it works on two different fronts. The first of these is the relationship between individuals and political representatives. The second is the relationship among citizens. Let us take up the first of these. 46. 47. Deliberative democrats require as part of their justificatory matrix that "others" see the validity of the principles that underwrite political and economic institutions and the policies that follow. This is vital to the understanding of the public sphere that deliberative democrats endorse. The public sphere is an arena in which individuals understand themselves as members of a political community to the extent that they can register their opinions in response to potential laws and policies and those already in existence to influence their shape. So if fairness and equality are to be secured for historically excluded groups, public policies must, by dint of their claims to legitimacy, gain the assent of those who they claim to serve or those most likely to be affected. So, for example, deliberation about what sanctions should be put in place to effectively deal with racial profiling in legal enforcement units cannot legitimately get off the ground if those most impacted by profiling are excluded from the conversation. Yet, we all know that topics can be excluded from the agenda, and specific problems such as racial profiling can be blocked from being thematized. However, reciprocal accountability views policy responses to discrimination and the historical results of racism, or the absence of such policies by political officials as actions for which they can be held to give an account. If "others" can see the rationality of policies, they can also dispute policy agenda setting by pointing to important features of social reality (i.e. blacks being indiscriminately pulled over on interstate highways) that are necessary to do justice to justice. To see the validity of political principles and policies is to understand them to be candidates for praise and endorsement or blame and rejection. And so this institutionalizes a mechanism of opposition, the nature of which not only contributes to the strength of legitimacy, but is also its life's blood. This begins to shift our emphasis from the institutions that support deliberation, to the content of deliberation that is coextensive with what legitimizes its outcome. If social identities, actions, and institutional developments are constituted through narrative, then deliberation must also be narratively mediated in the public sphere to understand the recurring presence of race and racial solidarity. In other words, one cannot adequately describe the process of deliberation and its origination without presupposing the elements of narrativity. Deliberation's origination in the pressures of collective organization underscores the centrality of setting; its attempt to follow changes in the environment as information for a possible reorientation in action denotes its temporal dimension; and its goal to achieve intersubjective understanding becomes possible because of acknowledged reciprocal accountability. Thus, deliberation turns out to be an instantiation of narrativity. Given this, political legitimacy itself is narratively formed through an on-going dialogue regarding political principles and the institutionalization of policies among those who share a common political horizon. Let me first try to say something about what this does for conversations about race.

#### Democracy is the only system that can enable political legitimacy

Rogers 10 summarizes Dewey. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) Contemporary Pragmatism Editions Rodopi Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 2010), 69–91 Dewey and His Vision of Democracy Melvin L. Rogers. P 83-84. NP 3/12/17.

The considerations above, which directly engage Lippmann, are part of how Dewey understands the historical emergence of democracy as a way of broadening the use of political power. Indeed, he defends this view in The Public and Its Problems. Throughout the work, Dewey consistently emphasizes the fortuitous emergence of political democracy (chap. 3). He resists the idea that democracy was fated to happen. By political democracy he means “a mode of government, a specified practice in selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials” through universal suffrage, that emphasizes the publicity of decision making (286). Despite its contingent emergence, Dewey argues that democracy’s development nonetheless represents an “effort in the first place to counteract the forces that have so largely determined the possession of rule by accidental and irrelevant factors, and in the second place an effort to counteract the tendency to employ political power to serve private instead of public ends” (287). In keeping with his discussion in The Public and Its Problems and Liberalism and Social Action, he sees democratic liberalism emerging in an attempt to block political power from being exercised arbitrarily: “I would not minimize the advance scored in substitution of methods of discussion and conference for the method of arbitrary rule.”53 The use of power is arbitrary, for him, when it cannot be substantively informed by those over whom it will be exercised. In such instances, Dewey argues, freedom itself is threatened. So legitimate political power is not merely restrictive – that is, it does not merely constrain freedom – but more significantly, it makes freedom possible by giving citizens control over the forces that govern and enable their lives. Political power thus refers to both the role individuals play in “forming and directing the activities” of the community to which they belong, and also the possibility that is open to them for “participating according to need in the values” that their community sustains (328). Dewey’s defense of democracy is important for redefining the meaning of political participation, signaled by the last bit of quoted text. Democracy, as he describes it, defines members not simply by virtue of the actual participation with which citizens engage in determining social possibilities, but also by the potential participation that remains open to them if need so arises. For him, to the extent that power functions to determine social possibilities, those 84 MELVIN L. ROGERS possibilities cannot be of such a nature that they preclude the future contestability and development of how power functions. Hence the following remark: “The strongest point to be made in behalf of even such rudimentary political forms as democracy has already attained, popular voting, majority rule and so on, is that to some extent they involve a consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and troubles” (364). To be attentive to such needs and troubles means that “policies and proposals for social action [should] be treated as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed” (362). As he had argued decades earlier, to say that we hold in reserve the power to contest indicates that the legitimacy of decision making hinges on the extent to which citizens do not feel permanently bound by those decisions in the face of new and different political changes. Of course Lippmann would not deny this, but for Dewey he is unable to flesh out a meaningful view of contestation that relies on the necessary input of the public. Given that The Public and Its Problems is, at least in part, concerned with diminishing the use of arbitrary power, Dewey not only seeks to position us to identify when political actors may potentially fail to subject their actions to democratic oversight, but he also positions us to highlight why they may refuse. This will often point more directly to material, social, and institutional incentives that discourage one from engaging in deliberation and genuine problem solving. Such conditions highlight the extent to which power has become concentrated in the hands of a few to the disadvantage of broad-base inclusion, and allow us to recognize, at the very least, when we have exhausted the quest to transform our institutions from within and when we must stand in an more oppositional relationship to them. The result is that citizens, Dewey argues, will have to create, through protest or violence, a new space where inquiry may once again thrive in the service of collective problem-solving. His argument on this point relates directly to his descriptions of the public and the state; indeed, his account of the relationship between the public and the state brings into view the normative work his concern with managing power does for democracy and how it potentially enables a more radical politics.

# Free speech good

#### Free communication is necessary to make the pragmatist methodology, which outweighs under the standard

West 89 summarizes Dewey, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 106. NP 2/25/17.

Similar to the concerns of Jiirgen Habermas in our own time, Dewey's preoccupation with communication proceeds out of a deep commitment to rational dialogue in an irrational culture. Dewey's notion of communi-cation, however, does not simply undergird a regulative ideal that fore-closes relativistic conclusions, but, more important, serves as the vehicle to create and constitute actual communities for the amelioration of existing circumstances. For Dewey, the move from "our Babel"lo5 to "the great community" is a matter of cultural politics, in which communication rest-ing upon shared values and promoting diversity must playa combative role. On the surface, it appears that Dewey has not really moved too far from his Thought News project with Franklin Ford of forty-three years earlier or the democratic sentiments he shared with T. H. Green, Henry Carter Adams, and his first wife, Alice (who died in 1927). But, on a deeper level, we can see that this is not so. First, Dewey is now more intent on making the experimental method accessible than on making the facts available. Second, he is more aware-though, in many ways, still not sufficiently aware-of the dynamics of power in capitalist America (especially given the Depression) than he was before. Third, his project is no longer a matter of simply making philosophy relevant by means of journalistic intervention in the popular marketplace of ideas, but rather of making society democratic by pitting popular cultural transformation against a dominating economic oligarchy.

#### Democratic principles must be manifested in educational institutions – this requires free expression to ensure that students appreciate the viewpoints of others

Stack and Simpson 10, Stack, Sam F. and Douglas J. Simpson (2010). Teachers, Leaders, and Schools : Essays by John Dewey. Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press. Pg 210-211. NP 3/2/17.

Accordingly, Dewey’s emphasis on democracy has political, social, and in-dividual dimensions. Political democracy includes the political process and the structure of government and underscores such values as respect, equality, justice, tolerance, and freedom. Social democracy implies an enactment of the values of political democracy throughout a society at the level of common interests, inter-action, compassion, and communication. The personal dimension of democracy refers to individuals’ personal attitudes, dispositions, habits, and behaviors that make social and political democracy possible. Without the personal dimension of democracy, the social dimension is superficial and the political is hollow. When all three dimensions of democracy are strong and vibrant, the educative forces of society are coherent, active, and complementary. But this has seldom been the case and certainly an ideal democracy has yet to materialize in human history. Nevertheless, this is not grounds for pessimism. Instead, it is an opportunity for intentional, intelligent development, both individually and socially.Democracy, in its several dimensions and manifold complexities, is vitally related to education and the growth of desirable dispositions and habits of thinking and acting. Dewey believed the democratic community called school should guide the development of open communication, common interests, mutual respect, and shared goals. Within this environment, administrators, students, teachers, and other stakeholders would learn to live, think, and act democratically by experiencing democratic processes on a regular basis. Inquiry into fields of understanding would be similarly democraticized in that claims, information, data, and arguments would be considered and evaluated on the basis of relevant public criteria, not irrelevant matters, such as a person’s social class, religion, economic status, age, race, sexual orientation, or gender. A genuinely democratic educator integrates the political, social, and personal aspects of democracy into daily activities whether in the classroom, the principal’s office, or the superintendent’s suite. The three dimensions are woven together to form an intricate and developing culture of democracy. In this way, freedom of inquiry, mutual respect, and friendly communication form a nexus of experience. For these reasons, Dewey believed that freedom of intelligence (freedom of inquiry) and freedom of speech were cornerstones of the demo-cratic way of life and education. But these freedoms need to be buttressed by the value of respect for the rights of others to their opinions, including the right to disagree. Hence, students as inquirers and young citizens should learn to listen to others, consider others’ interests, discuss issues, and, frequently, dispute so-called facts, findings, and interpretations. Whether in familial surroundings, school classrooms, neighborhood gatherings, corporate boardrooms, civic engagements, or government chambers, the values of democracy—guided by a free social intelligence—should be manifested habitually in order to ensure that government by the people is a reality. APA (American Psychological Assoc.) Dewey’s democratic ethic, therefore, is an encompassing approach to gov-erning, living, and growing both in schools and the rest of society. In all of its ramifications, democracy is grounded in a reflective faith rather than a pes-simistic cynicism. It is a faith that believes that listening to the voices of others will lead to a better understanding of all community members and the needs of everyone. In the interlacing of personal and community concerns, the individual realizes that even within free societies, choices and actions have consequences on groups as well as individuals. Personal and social democracy are intimately joined with political democracy, the form of government that should protect the values of freedom, justice, opportunity, equality, tolerance, openness, and participation. Each of these values needs to be protected from those who have the power—political, economic, religious, social, and so on—to undermine, weaken, truncate, or destroy them. One of the functions of citizens and schools is to question and critique governmental, social, and educational structures that undercut democratic processes, structures, policies, and values.

#### Even if they claim to speak from a position of valuing some external important political goal, censorship always fill the same purpose – to consolidate power and serve the interest of the group in control. Ignore contrary warrants about why free speech fails.

Stack and Simpson 10, Stack, Sam F. and Douglas J. Simpson (2010). Teachers, Leaders, and Schools : Essays by John Dewey. Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press. Pg 218-219. NP 3/2/17.

Another great American democrat, Abraham Lincoln, left as his heritage the statement that democracy is Government of, for, and by the people. I have italicized the preposition “by” because government cannot possibly be by the people save when and where the freedom of intelligence is publicly and actively supported. It is debatable whether it can for any long period be for the people and not for a governing clique or bureaucracy save where the rights of public discussion and criticism are held inviolate. Revolutionary periods, of which from a world-wide point of view the present is one, tend toward a concentration of power. The concentration claims for itself that it is in the best interests of the people at large. At the outset, that may be the case in fact. But nothing is more certain than unless its movement is attended by scrupulous attentive observance of the principle of freedom of intelligence in action it will rapidly degenerate into the rule of a small section, maintained by use of force, in its own special interest. It is for this reason that it is so peculiarly, almost uniquely, important at the present time not to be distracted into allowing any issue, no matter how useful in itself, to displace freedom of intelligence in public communication by means of speech, publication in daily and weekly press, in books, in public assemblies, in scientific inquiry, as the centre and burning focus of democracy. Nothing will be more fatal in the end than surrender and compromise on this point. Now, more than ever, it is urgently necessary to hold it in steady view as the heart from which flows the life-blood of democracy. I should not close without definite recal of the fact that it was the pioneers of freedom of thought and speech in France in the eighteenth century, who in spite of every sort of interference by those professing to speak in the name of moral authority and social stability made that century the period of The Éclaircisse-ment, The Enlightenment, out of which has issued all that is best and truest in the democratic spirit first in the civilization of the West and now in promise if not yet in execution of the entire world. If the peoples who have behind them and still with them the living tradition of supreme and steady regard for free-dom of intelligence in operation in all channels of communication now live up to their heritage, they, we, shall issue from the present crisis with purification of the life-blood of democracy. In surmounting the cruel trials of the present crisis we shall have opened the way to a nobler, because freer, manifestation of the human spirit.

#### Schools must be guardians of free expression – otherwise students will be willing to cede to external authorities after leaving educational institutions,

Stack and Simpson 10, Stack, Sam F. and Douglas J. Simpson (2010). Teachers, Leaders, and Schools : Essays by John Dewey. Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press. Pg 227-229. NP 3/2/17.

There is, however, one domain in which fear of governmental action never became dominant in American life. That is the domain of education. In this field, the founding fathers proclaimed with well-nigh unanimous voice that government, local and state if not national, should act positively and constructively. This voice has been constantly re-echoed throughout the course of our history by political and educational statesmen alike. The voice has awakened a warmer response in the hearts of the American people than any other appeal made to them. Doubtless many parents have responded to the appeal because they felt that school education opened doors to material opportunity and success that were otherwise closed to their children. But the appeal and the response have not been merely material. The American faith in education has been grounded in the belief that without education the ideal of free and equal opportunity is an idle fantasy; that of all the guarantees of free development, education is the surest and the most effective. This fact imposes a great responsibility upon the schools and upon the educators who conduct them. What have the schools done to bring the social-economic goal of freedom nearer to realization? What have they failed to do? What can and should they do to combat the threats which imperil freedom? The mere raising of these questions calls attention to one phase of freedom, a fundamental one which has not been touched upon in the previous discussion—Intellectual Freedom. The Bill of Rights in the federal Constitution (unfortunately not found in all state constitutions) guarantees, as far as law can guarantee anything, freedom of belief, of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of petition. These are aspects of what I have called intellectual freedom, but which perhaps would better be called moral freedom. Eternal vigilance is even more the price of liberty with respect to these liberties than in the case of liberty of external action. The enemies of liberty of thought and expression in fields where it is felt that this liberty might encroach upon privileges possessed and might disturb the existing order, are organized and determined. The ultimate stay and support of these liberties are the schools. For it is they which more than any other single agency, are concerned with development of free inquiry, discussion and expression. Nor is it enough that the schools by example and precept should instill faith in the precious character of these forms of freedom, or even that they should themselves be living models of the practise of freedom of inquiry, experi-mentation, and communication. These things are indeed to be cultivated. But the schools have also the responsibility of seeing to it that those who leave its walls have ideas that are worth thinking and worth being expressed, as well as having the courage to express them against the opposition of reactionaries and standpatters. It is quite possible that in the long run the greatest friend of censorship, whether public and explicit or private and insidious, and the greatest foe to freedom of thought and expression, is not those who fear such freedom because of its possible effect upon their own standing and fortune, but is the triviality and irrelevancy of the ideas that are entertained, and the futile and perhaps corrupting way in which they are expressed. It is indeed necessary to have freedom of thought and expression. But just because this is necessary for the health and progress of society, it is even more necessary that ideas should be genuine ideas, not sham ones, the fruit of inquiry, of observation and experimentation, the collection and weighing of evidence. The formation of the attitudes which move steadily in this direc-tion is the work and responsibility of the school more than of any other single institution. Routine and formal instruction, undemocratic administration of schools, is perhaps the surest way of creating a human product that submits readily to external authority, whether that be imposed by force or by custom and tradition, or by the various forms of social pressure which the existing economic system produces. It is idle to expect the schools to send out [people] young men and women who will stand actively and aggressively for the cause of free intelligence in meeting social problems and attaining the goal of freedom un less the spirit of free intelligence pervades the organization, administration, studies, and methods of the school itself. Educators have a primary responsibility in this respect. In the words of the original brief formulation of the Social-Economic Goals of America, “more and more should teachers become community leaders of thought.” But teachers can-not accomplish this task alone. In the further language of the same formulation, “In that role they will need group solidarity and the support of public opinion, aroused to appreciate the fundamental importance of this aspect of freedom.” The emphasis that is placed upon a greater measure of economic freedom for the mass of the people is not final. It does not stand alone. Ultimately, the economic freedom (which is dependent upon economic security) is a means to cultural freedom, to the release of the human spirit in all its capacities for development through science, art, and unconstrained human intercourse. The school is par excellence the potential social organ for promoting this liberation. In ultimate analysis, freedom is important because it is a condition both of realization of the potentialities of an individual and of social progress. Without light, a people perishes. Without freedom, light grows dim and darkness comes to reign. Without freedom, old truths become so stale and worn that they cease to be truths and become mere dictates of external authority. Without freedom, search for new truth and the disclosure of new paths in which humanity may walk more securely and justly come to an end. Freedom which is liberation for the individual, is the ultimate assurance of the movement of society toward more humane and noble ends. [s]He who would put the freedom of others in bond, especially freedom of inquiry and communication, creates conditions which finally imperil his own freedom and that of his offspring. Eternal vigilance is the price of the conservation and extension of freedom, and the schools should be the ceaseless guardians and creators of this vigilance.

#### Opposition to racism can only be a legitimate part of the American national identity if public discourse is possible – otherwise this identity can not be freely chosen

Post 91. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 267 (1991), <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/4>. NP 3/11/17.

Questions of personal identity are in fact always at stake in discussions of collective self-definition. For this reason effective political dialogue requires that participants be constantly willing to be transformed. As Frank Michelman points out, public discourse is impossible so long as "the participants' pre-political self-understandings and social perspectives must axiomatically be regarded as completely impervious to the persuasion of the process itself."'1 2 As our collective aspirations change, so will our respective personal identities. Thus restrictions on public discourse designed to protect those identities from harm will necessarily also restrict self-determination as to our collective life. If group harm is an inevitable price of the political constitution of group identity, individual injury is an unavoidable cost of the political constitution of community identity. It is important to emphasize the narrowness of this conclusion. In recent years an important theme of our national life has been the opposition to racism. We have enacted that opposition by legally regulating racist behavior like discrimination. Because action both creates and manifests identity, this regulation inhibits the formation and expression of racist identities. So also does regulation prohibiting certain kinds of racist speech in nonpublic speech, as for example in the workplace.73 In effect we have determined to use government force to reshape community institutions in order to combat racism. This is an appropriate and laudable use of democratic power. 74 But it is legitimate precisely because we have adopted it in a manner consistent with the principle of self-determination; it reflects a national identity that we have freely chosen. This legitimacy is possible because of public discourse, which serves the value of self-determination because it is so structured that every call for national identity has the opportunity to make its case. There is a significant difference, therefore, between proscribing racial insults directed toward individuals in the workplace 175 and proscribing them in a political discussion or debate. 176 The harm to the individual victim may be the same, but for public discourse to enable self-government, racist speech within that discourse must be repudiated on the merits, rather than be silenced by force of law.

# Relation of free speech good --≥ democratic methodology

#### Discussion and inquiry are necessary to create racial solidarity and resolve misconceptions surrounding racial issues

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (61-62) NP 3/3/17.

Obviously, problems are not common problems prior to political deliberation. By way of inquiry we come to see certain problems as shared. Such conclusions are not antecedent to our actions but, rather, are the fruits of our efforts to orient ourselves effectively in relation to particular experiences. I should note, however, that inquiry not only results in determinations that we might share problems, but also allows us to assess the relative merit of a claim that denies the idea of a commonly shared problem. Gooding-Williams rightly notes that in the post–Jim Crow or post–civil rights era a number, let’s say a third, of African Americans might believe that there are no substantive obstacles to their living a middle-class life in America. Some, like Ward Connerly, even argue that race no longer impedes up-ward mobility. But to my mind this is an empirical question—a claim to be tested in experience. To simply acknowledge that African Americans hold different assumptions or draw varied conclusions about their life-chances in the United States does not end the conversation. It is fairly obvious that individuals can be wrong in their views of racism. I can imagine, for example, a few black slaveholders arguing for the merits of the institution of slavery. Other commitments may blind them to the racial and unjust dimensions of slavery. If someone were to claim that banks do not discriminate on the basis of race when they issue loans to Americans, or deny that, on occasion, law enforcement officers engage in a kind of policing that singles out black drivers unjustly, **data could be cited to contradict their assertion.** What is needed in this instance—and Gooding-Williams is right in this regard—is a vibrant conversation and debate. Race language can servein these deliberations (though not necessarily) as a useful tool for delin-eating problems and generating effective resolutions. My aim, contrary to what Gooding-Williams takes my argument to be, is to locate the pro-cesses of black identity formation in these efforts and to highlight themessy politics such efforts always involve.

#### Dialogue about race and biases is central to the creation of a deliberative democracy

Rogers 2, Melvin. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) *Liberalism, Narrative, and Identity: A Pragmatic Defense of Racial Solidarity*. 2002. NP 3/12/17.

What would this account mean regarding conversations about race in American public discourse? Here we come to the second way in which reciprocal accountability does work. This pulls in more clearly the other features of narrative theory already discussed. Lani Guiner, for example, has argued for an honest conversation about race in America.[73] This suggest that we have talked much about race, but very little of it has been candid. Perhaps this is because interlocutors have not listened to each other, and political representatives unfortunately have exacerbated this situation in playing power politics. We need only be reminded of the worry that when blacks articulate claims in the public sphere that make race central, they are merely beating the proverbial dead horse. Conversation, thus, deteriorate into claims about blacks' failure to take full advantage of the American Dream, and the like.[74] But the articulation of this claim does not ipso facto make it accurate, and so it cannot serve as a way to defeat the claims of black interlocutors. In other words, arguments that blacks are merely complaining require reasons for the accuracy of that account. So the test is not for African Americans to provide reasons for believing that racial discrimination is still prevalent, although that will be necessary, but also for individuals rejecting that argument to provide reasons for why the contention that discrimination is still central to the practices of the U.S. is inaccurate. This initiates a give and take relationship central to narrative and fundamental to the workings of deliberation. And it is through this give and take that we come to see how the exclusion of blacks both figuratively and practically is still tied up with existing economic and political institutions. In other words, we are now compelled to tell thicker stories about our environment to achieve intersubjective understanding about specific environing conditions so as to generate possible solutions.[75] This is undoubtedly an interpretative project, and suggests that deliberation in the public sphere, though it is over specific problematic situations, demand that parties try to achieve understanding regarding the positions of others. Political debate is not simply about trying to articulate claims regarding distribution and fairness, but rather about trying to transpose oneself into the setting of another so that legitimacy can be sustained regarding policies that concern distribution and fairness in the first instance. Indeed, it is an attempt to extend the limits of the hearer's understanding by moving between the reasons of the hearer and their interlocutors. On close inspection this most assuredly should take them to individual and collective biographies and the place that the problematic situation assumes in their lives. Here, dialogue helps us further humanize the person with whom we are engaging, thus creating the possibility for understanding. The hope, as it can be nothing more than that with deliberation, is that conversation will create, to borrow from James Bohman, "new categories or expand old ones in order to incorporate these life histories and their . . . experiences."[76] But more importantly, these categories may provide ways to think about why specific proposals are offered or actions are taken. In the case of race, it may suggest that if we speak to those environing conditions, we can also change how blacks configure their relationship to the larger environment of the U.S. If our most important actions emanate from the categories we have in our minds about the world, then more work must be done on those categories to affect change that is lasting and deep rather than momentary and superficial.

#### Free and open deliberation that pushes ideas out into the open is the only way to be consistent with procedural constraints of democracy and recognize particularity of contexts

Rogers 10 summarizes Dewey. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) Contemporary Pragmatism Editions Rodopi Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 2010), 69–91 Dewey and His Vision of Democracy Melvin L. Rogers. P 82-83. NP 3/12/17.

The significance Dewey accords deliberation among citizens yields another point regarding the fact of conflict in modern societies that sends us back to “The Ethics of Democracy.” As he says in The Public and Its Problems: “Differences of opinion in the sense of differences of judgment as to the course which it is best to follow, the policy which it is best to try out, will still exist” (362). Writing now in his post-Hegelian period, Dewey can more easily concede this point. And he amplifies the claim years later in Liberalism and Social Action, arguing that deliberation works to bring “conflicts [among citizens] out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised” in understanding the depth and complexity of the political problems and policy proposals.50 To say that deliberation brings conflict out into the open is not to deny that one result of this process may be a deepening of dissonance. Indeed, we will often have conflicts among groups that will need to be mitigated with the least amount of cost to democratic commitments. But, he explains in The Public and Its Problems how he understands the centrality of deliberation: “But opinion in the sense of beliefs formed and held in the absence of evidence will be reduced in quantity and importance. No longer will views generated in views of special situations be frozen into absolute standards and masquerade as eternal truths” (362). For him, the genuineness of deliberation holds out the trans- formative possibility of un-stiffening our commitments – our commitments matter, he argues, but they should never grip us so tightly that they are beyond revision and contestation. Coextensive with democratic decision making are both the transformative role that underwrites how we come to understand political problems in their various dimensions and that contributes to the possibility of forging shared values for action, and informational purposes of communication in con- textualizing expert knowledge. These two elements, Dewey argues, mean that lay and expert knowledge gains whatever vitality it has from being forged through deliberative process that makes each responsive to the other. Without the participation of citizens – understood by Dewey as substantive input – justification of one’s actions would come uncoupled from being accountable to the public. There is a practical upshot to Dewey’s argument. For example, where decision making is based less on the continuous input from public hearings, town hall meetings, advisory councils, and other deliberative bodies, there is greater reason to be concerned about the ends to which those decisions aim and the background interests from which they proceed. Moreover, there is reason to be equally suspicious of bureaucratic processes that are resistant to expanding decision making power by taking a bottom-up approach.51 Of course there may be good reason not to take such an approach, as for example when we think Dewey and His Vision of Democracy 83 about the obstacles that limited resources and time pose for political decision making. Here Lippmann’s point about the obstacles to broad-based inclusion is inescapable. But Dewey’s argument implies that the burden of proof must rest with those who seek less rather than more inclusive arrangements.52 So to the extent that experts guide political power without taking direction from the public in the form of deliberation, the entire decision making process loses in legitimacy what it gains in suspicion.

#### Role of educators is create an environment that values free expression rather than fearing intellectual diversity

Stack and Simpson 10, Stack, Sam F. and Douglas J. Simpson (2010). Teachers, Leaders, and Schools : Essays by John Dewey. Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press. Pg 228. NP 3/2/17.

In the second article, “Democracy Is Radical” (LW11.296–99), Dewey asserts that true democracy should be distinguished both from state control over the means of production and from a bourgeois or purely capitalistic democracy that privileges the economic freedom of individuals above the interests of the soci-ety as a whole. Indeed, he might well have asked how any nation that is largely controlled by financial capitalists looking out solely for their own interests or by those who employ distortion, oppression, brutality, inequity, and war to manage society could be deemed a democracy. Although he recognizes that even those who are not wealthy sometimes profit from unbridled capitalism, he insists that democracy must remain radical: it must insist that both the means and the ends of democracy be respected. That is to say, it must be achieved by means that show respect for all people, honor freedom of speech, demonstrate open consultation, and prize individuality. For educators, one of the issues becomes: Will I use my professional power to indoctrinate my students into my ideology, or will I employ it to introduce diverse ideas to my students? Will I impose my important values and ideas on students to counteract the socially engrained beliefs they already hold? Another idea that is intrinsic, although frequently misunderstood, to the concept of democracy is freedom. The essay “Freedom” (LW11.247–55) is Dewey’s attempt to clarify his understanding of that notion. As is evident in humanity’s many struggles for independence and political freedom, freedom in democracy involves a personal and social association, one with great responsibility. He was concerned that our earlier pioneer spirit of freedom and exploration had led in the modern era to rampant individualism, consumerism, and laissez-faire capi-talism that fears government and threatens democracy. He argues that schools can play a vital role in preparing students to understand and respect freedom, including intellectual freedom. But many schools act as if they fear freedom of inquiry, speech, and expression. In a time when freedom and schools were be-ing co-opted by nationalists and socialists for purposes of propaganda, Dewey urged them to protect a democratic way of life and of education, reminding educators that negative freedom—that is, absence of constraint, or freedom from government—is secondary to positive freedom—when government contributes to the well-being of citizens because it reflects their interests and equalizes opportunities. Writing at the time of the Great Depression, he points to the bitter lesson that unconstrained individualistic enterprise can be harmful not only to the individual whose fortune is at risk, but to society in general. Thus, freedom is not solely an economic or political issue, but a moral one. And no one has more responsibility—or opportunity—to nurture democratic ideals in young people than teachers.

#### Parrhesia revives civic engagement and riches our philosophical understanding of democracy and the world

Burch 9. KerryBurch (Northern Illinois University). PARRHESIA AS A PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC PEDAGOGY. 2009 Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society/Volume 40. files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ864311.pdf (pg 77-79). NP 3/2/17.

Among its other virtues, parrhesia is an ideal well suited for scrutinizing the legitimacy of the war system and its discursive strategies of rationalization. The assumption here is that the schools, largely though not exclusively through curricular omission, have for decades served as breeding grounds for reproducing compliant citizen-warriors.18 Now we appear to be living in a permanent war environment, and if we recognize that the legitimacy of this environment requires a justifying ideology of war, we need to recognize that such an ideology is indebted to sophisticated practices of strategic deception—official lying—as a means for securing its own legitimacy. Hannah Arendt identified this trend in a chapter on the Pentagon Papers, in which she observed that the politics of war-making in its modern incarnation was being increasingly subordinated to the realm of public relations.19 Daniel Ellsberg, the figure responsible for the release of the Pentagon Papers, acted with rational-democratic courage in presenting to the New York Times and Washington Post classified state secrets about its war-time deceptions. Ellsberg‘s parrhesiatic action in 1972 exposed the lies and hypocrisies not only of the Nixon administration but also the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Ellsberg‘s heroic act further validated and emboldened the anti-war movement. But in an equally powerful, albeit less tangible way, his daring repudiation of the secrecy code to which he had sworn allegiance, challenged the cultural heroism of the masculine warrior-ethos.20 As we have seen, one of parrhesia‘s original functions was to criticize and expose authoritative deception in high places. Ellsberg‘s decision thus embodies the moral values contained within parrhesia‘s symbolic boundaries. Ellsberg reflects on the decades-long pattern of strategic deception he helped expose: The American public was lied to month by month by each of these five administrations, from 1950 on. As I say, it‘s a tribute to the American people that their leaders perceived that they had to be lied to. It‘s no tribute to us that it was so easy to fool the public.21 It is sobering to have to admit today that it remains ―so easy to fool the public.‖ Arguably having repressed the trauma of Vietnam and its lessons, the public mind in its learned amnesia, re-performed a national repetition-compulsion— from My Lai to Abu Ghraib. While public ignorance and passivity is nothing new on the historical stage, Ellsberg‘s statement should provoke us to reconsider the ways in which we can educate persons to be ―less easy to fool as citizens of a public. It would seem that foremost on our pedagogical agendas ought to be the task of cultivating those democratic habitudes and philosophical values that would not only make our students less vulnerable to manipulation by authoritative deception, but would also encourage in them a desire and willingness to become citizens of a public. Few educational thinkers describe the types of democratic personality traits that need to be cultivated today as elegantly as William Ayers. These traits cannot easily be brought about by relying on the mechanistic knowledge ordained in conventional approaches to ―learning‖ about ―democracy.‖ Ayers‘ charts an alternate course: ―We want to teach them to take initiative, to be creative, to be imaginative, to take risks, to question authority, to wonder about the world. This means fundamentally, in a school system based on democratic values, we really believe that the full development of all is a condition for the full development of each.‖22 For teachers to educate the citizenship of the citizen in the best sense would mean to transgress the boundaries of the faux-rationalism now dominant within the schools. What would it mean for teachers to transgress on behalf of the democratic values? In responding to this predicament, Ayers tacitly captures the core meaning of parrhesia while linking its beneficial consequences to a conception of the classroom as a public square: And as soon as they begin to question—―Why is it like this? Could it be otherwise?‖—they are opening themselves to the possibility of stepping into the public square. And the public square doesn‘t mean the New York Times, or standing up at a giant rally in Washington, D.C. The public square is where we are open to one another without filters, without masks, and in a certain sense without fear, although fear is always with us. The sense of being able to say out loud that this is not good, this is not helpful for kids, or this is not the way we ought to do it. And then we come together, naming obstacles to address, and in that way we have created a public square, which is something we create again and again, or we somehow fail to create. It‘s not something that is sitting there waiting for us. It‘s something you must bring to life.23 (my emphasis) Here we see what could happen when the value of parrhesia is taken seriously as a pedagogical instrument of value. That is, emotionally arid and intellectually sterile classrooms could be transformed into erotic, articulate publics-in-the-making.24 Through Ayers‘ vision of the classroom as a public square, it becomes more evident how the buoyant sociality of parrhesia would promote the creation of critically awake democratic personalities. With its rich inventory of democratic and philosophical associations--especially its ability to inspire civic passion-- there is good reason to believe that parrhesia could serve today as a pedagogical ―moral equivalent of war.‖25

#### Parrhesia is a necessary component of political pedagogy to safeguard democratic ontologies and cohere with the pragmatist respect for multiculturalism and diversity of opinion

Burch 9. KerryBurch (Northern Illinois University). PARRHESIA AS A PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC PEDAGOGY. 2009 Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society/Volume 40. files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ864311.pdf (pg 79-80). NP 3/2/17.

In Democracy Matters, Cornel West theorizes parrhesia in ways that affirm its value as a pedagogical principle vital to the formation of democratic identities.26 He presents a conception of national identity grounded in the contradictory values of democracy versus the ―might makes right‖ values of imperialism. West takes aim at the myth of American exceptionalism and its symbiotic relation to the expansionist warrior ethos. Within this interpretation, the trajectory of U.S. history is driven by the unceasing clash of these opposing tendencies. One of the most compelling points West makes, echoing James Baldwin, is that in order for Americans to ―achieve their country,‖ we must develop the courage to integrate the repressed dark-side of the national memory into our civic self-conceptions. West praises parrhesia for its ability to bring radical scrutiny to the self-congratulatory platitudes which sustain dominant images of American identity. The mythic narratives of moral superiority and national innocence which inform American exceptionalism are predicated on the repression of public memories whose recovery would undermine the legitimacy of these very narratives. Thus, the pedagogical act of retrieving the forgotten memories of slavery, the nuclear attacks on the civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, My Lai, Abu Ghraib, or other signifiers of injustice, would qualify as parrhesiatic. To avoid reproducing images of national superiority, inconvenient truths in particular need to be brought into view and integrated into the American civic self-conception. Enter parrhesia as a heuristic device for opening up questions and dialogue about these unsavory, institutionally repressed dimensions of American public life. Significantly, West offers a synthesis of parrhesia‘s political dimension with that of caring for the self: In the face of elite manipulations and lies, we must draw on the Socratic. The Socratic commitment to questioning requires a relentless self-examination and critique of institutions of authority, motivated by an endless quest for intellectual integrity and moral consistency. It is manifest in fearless speech—parrhesia—that unsettles, unnerves, and unhouses people from their uncritical sleepwalking.27 West aptly defines the content of parrhesia‘s pedagogical telos: a project that ―unsettles, unnerves and unhouses people from their uncritical sleepwalking.‖ Such a project can be directed outward toward a critique of institutions of authority or inward toward a critique of one‘s own thinking. The concept thus has the advantage of functioning both as an ontological basis for democratic ideology as well as a potential critique of that selfsame ideology To summarize, I would like to suggest a two part justification for parrhesia‘s inclusion into our pedagogical quivers. First, since one of the purposes of philosophy of education courses is to stimulate critical, independent thinking about students‘ place in the world and who they are as teachers and citizens, it follows that we are talking about educating toward a specific mode of being. This mode of being can be generalized under the heading of a ―democratic civic ontologyor a ―democratic personality formation.‖ Such a formation (by whatever label) will come into being more readily if teachers were to harness the energies and devotions of parrhesia as an intellectual and moral ideal. Further, because the interrogatory qualities of parrhesia can be directed externally or internally—toward official authorities as well as toward one‘s own thinking—it is dialectical owing to its capacity to highlight the complex relations that exist between the ―psyche and the city.‖ Secondly, parrhesia can help fulfill and integrate those dispositions which together constitute a holistic conception of democratic citizenship. The character traits that define democratic selfhood-- questioning, passion for public affairs, dialogue, the capacity to revise, imagination, initiative, a sense of equality, a concern for the common good, an ability to enact positive forms of freedom —are traits derivative of parrhesia. Moreover, as a secular and provisional form of subjective truth, parrhesia appears to be in alignment with how American pragmatists have theorized conceptions of truth conducive to a pluralistic, multicultural society.28 These marvelous qualities and democratic purposes are sequestered within its symbolic boundaries. For all of these reasons, parrhesia represents a sound pedagogical principle for achieving democratic courage in action, a principle sorely needed today to counter the debilitating effects of a market-driven education and the dogged tenacity of the American warrior ethos.

#### Labeling arguments as hate speech is to refuse to engage with them and undermine the foundation of democracy

Malik 12, Kenan. (Malik is a writer, lecturer and broadcaster) Why Hate Speech Should Not Be Banned. <https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/> NP 2/22/17.

KM: Free speech and democracy are intimately linked. Without free speech there is no democracy. That is why any restriction on speech must be kept to the absolute minimum. There are two ways in which banning hate speech undermines democracy. First, democracy can only work if every citizen believes that their voice counts. That however outlandish, outrageous, or obnoxious one’s belief may be, they nevertheless have the right to express it and to try to win support for it. When people feel they no longer possess that right, then democracy itself suffers, as does the legitimacy of those in power. Not just the banning of hate speech but the very categorization of an argument or a sentiment as ‘hate speech’ can be problematic for the democratic process. I am in no doubt that some speech is designed to promote hatred. And I accept that certain arguments – like the direct incitement of violence – should indeed be unlawful. But the category ‘hate speech’ has come to function quite differently from prohibitions on incitement to violence. It has become a means of rebranding obnoxious political arguments as immoral and so beyond the boundaries of accepted reasonable debate. It makes certain sentiments illegitimate, thereby disenfranchising those who hold such views. And this brings me to the second point as to why the banning of hate speech undermines democracy. Branding an opinion as ‘hate speech’ does not simply disenfranchise those holding such a view; it also absolves the rest of us of the responsibility of politically challenging it. Where once we might have challenged obnoxious or hateful sentiments politically, today we are more likely simply to seek to outlaw them. In 2007, James Watson, the codiscoverer of the structure of DNA, claimed of Africans that their ‘intelligence is not the same as ours’ and that blacks are genetically intellectually inferior. He was rightly condemned for his arguments. But most of those who condemned him did not bother challenging the arguments, empirically or politically. They simply insisted that it is morally unacceptable to imagine that blacks are intellectually inferior. Britain’s Equality and Human Rights Commission studied the remarks to see if it could bring any legal action. London’s Science Museum, at which Watson was to have delivered a lecture, canceled his appearance, claiming that the Nobel Laureate had ‘gone beyond the point of acceptable debate.’ New York’s Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, of which Watson was director, not only disowned Watson’s remarks but forced him eventually to resign. I fundamentally disagree with Watson. Indeed I have written more than one book challenging such ideas, and have many times publicly debated their supporters. But I also think that it was as legitimate for Watson to have expressed his opinion as it is for me to express mine, even if I believe his assertion was factually wrong, morally suspect, and politically offensive. Simply to dismiss Watson’s claim as beyond the bounds of reasonable debate is to refuse to confront the actual arguments, to decline to engage with an idea that clearly has considerable purchase, and therefore to do disservice to democracy.

# Frontlines

## A2 anti-ethics

#### Only pragmatism enables us to reconstruct philosophy to better understand social crises

West 89, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 71.-2 NP 2/25/17.

John Dewey is the culmination of the tradition of American pragmatism. After him, to be a pragmatist is to be a social critic, literary critic, or a poet -in short, a participant in cultural criticism and cultural creation. This does not mean that Dewey provides panaceas for philosophical prob-lems or solutions to societal crises. Rather, Dewey helps us see the complex and mediated ways in which philosophical problems are linked to societal cri**ses**. More important, Dewey enables us to view clashing conceptions of philosophy as struggles over cultural ways of life, as attempts to define the role and function of intellectual authorities in culture and society. For Dewey, to take modern historical consciousness seriously in philosophy is first and foremost to engage in metaphilosophical reflection, to reform and reconstruct philosophy as a mode of intellectual activity. To reform and reconstruct philosophy is both to demystify and to defend the most reliable mode of inquiry in modern culture, namely, critical intelligence best manifest in the community of scientists. And to demystify and defend critical intelligence is to render it more and more serviceable for the enhancement of human individuality, that is, the promotion of human beings who better control their conditions and thereby more fully create themselves (Le., advance creative democracy).

## A2 pessimism

#### Structural racism is not determinant – agents both act and are acted upon, meaning that the external world alone can not define them

Rogers 2, Melvin. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) *Liberalism, Narrative, and Identity: A Pragmatic Defense of Racial Solidarity*. 2002. NP 3/12/17.

Yet, Appiah fails to see that as a black American I am at least implicitly aware of myself as actively and purposefully projecting myself onto the external world in an effort at self definition, and simultaneously being called into question by the features of that external world. Coming to understand who I am requires others to attend to what it means to live within a set of ongoing stories that constitute my setting. "We are" -- to borrow language from another narrative theorist, Paul Ricoeur -- "oriented, as agents and sufferers of actions, toward the remembered past, the lived present, and the anticipated future of other people's behavior."[50] In the case of racial solidarity these features are the past and continued existence of racism and discrimination that continue to play a role in the U.S. These elements of the landscape are part and parcel of what is meant by setting, and they impinge on our sense of who we are and how we should orient ourselves in the world. As a result, it is partly the continued presence of discriminatory practices in the U.S. that informs the self-definition of black agents in such a way that prompts them to create and sustain camaraderie and community among similarly situated agents as a response. Apprehension and assessment of other subjects with whom we relate is partly determined by the larger context in which we find ourselves. This points, I believe, to a central problem that has long since been acknowledged regarding liberal theory, and which is appropriate in light of Appiah's argument -- namely, that moral agency is reified as a theoretical feature for understanding human subjects, political or otherwise, which, is in tension with their own historicity.[51] But we impoverish out attempts at achieving intelligibility regarding why social beings act as such in specific contexts when we fail to be attentive to what that context means to them.

## A2 Afro-Pess

### General

#### The inevitability of suffering does not lead to a pessimistic conclusion – only a melioristic account of evil gives individuals subject to oppression agency rather than characterizing them as passive and can recognize the contingency of current empirical phenomena

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (31-33) NP 3/3/17.

Classical pragmatists like Dewey reject the pessimistic conclusions drawn from the recognition of our precarious position in the world.41Dewey, for example, would readily agree with Schopenhauer that suffering is a constitutive feature of the world of action, but would insist that it points to only one side of the “double connection” of experience. Of course experience involves suffering. It is “primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something; of suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these terms.”42But the process of undergoing is never merely passive: experience is not simply a matter of receptivity. We are also agents—reacting, experimenting, concerned with influencing the direction of our encounters in such a way that they will benefit and not harm. These actions involve us in peril: conflicts of ends will occur and, more than likely, new sorts of problems will arise as old ones are resolved. But this is not necessarily a bad thing. It is part of what it means to be an organism interacting with its environment. Dewey would agree with Schopenhauer: our world is one in which suffering is inescapable. But, where Schopenhauer would conclude from this fact that it would have been better not to have been born, Dewey, like Emerson and James, responds with meliorism. Meliorism is the belief that our circumstances at a given moment, be they comparatively good or bad, can be improved. Such a view commends intelligent action in the sense that it encourages us to inquire into the amelioration of problems, individual and social, and the obstructions totheir resolution. Such a view doesn’t commit Dewey to a form of optimism. In fact, he explicitly rejects an optimistic orientation. In his words, meliorism “arouses confidence and a reasonable hopefulness as optimism does not. For the latter, in declaring that good is already realized in ultimate reality, tends to make us gloss over the evils that concretely exist.”43For Dewey, optimism—with its view that our world is the best possible world—“co-operates with pessimism . . . in benumbing sympathetic insight and intelligent effort in reform.” Moreover, “it beckons men away from the world of relativity and change into the calm of the absolute and eternal.”44Here Dewey echoes William James. James wrote that “meliorism treats salvation as neither necessary nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the ac-tual conditions of salvation become.”45To put the point in Deweyan lan-guage, we can indeed reconstruct our experiences for the better—can secure and stabilize some of the goods within them—once we have grasped, through critical intelligence, the conditions that make for those experiences. But our efforts are not guaranteed. The world of action is a world of change, “a precarious and perilous place,” which, when it is all said and done, retains its hazardous character, in spite of our intelligent efforts. The dangers may be modestly modified but hardly eliminated.46As Dewey writes in Experience and Nature: While philosophy has its source not in any special impulse or staked-off section of experience, but in the entire human predicament, this human situa-tion falls wholly within nature. It reflects the traits of nature; it gives indis-putable evidence that in nature itself qualities and relations, individualities and uniformities, finalities and efficacies, contingencies and necessities are inextricably bound. The harsh conflicts and happy coincidences of this interpenetration make experience what it consciously is; their manifest apparition creates doubt, forces inquiry, exacts choices, and imposes liability for the choices made.47We can never claim that intelligence will secure our lives once and for all or “save us from ruin or destruction.” The strangeness and unexpected aspects of nature will continuously interrupt, irritate, and exact choices from us. To think otherwise would be to turn our attention away from the facts of experience and suggest an unreasonable hopefulness that would lead away from the task of reconstruction.48To be sure, our conditions of living require “a certain intellectual pessimism, in the sense of a steadfast willingness to uncover sore points, to acknowledge and search for abuses, to note how presumed good often serves as a cloak for actual bad.”49Oursis indeed a life of suffering. But suffering is only a part of our experiences. We must always be mindful of our capacity to act on our world. If those efforts are frustrated (as perhaps they will be) or if they lead to other more complicated, nuanced problems (as they most assuredly will)such is the nature of our efforts to secure our world amid change. They are provisional and sometimes fail. But this fact should not lead us to turn our backs on this world or to believe that nonexistence is better than ex-istence. Responses like these reflect a desire for certainty and ultimate guarantees. Despite our best efforts, neither is possible nor, if we truly care about this world, desirable. Oliver Wendell Holmes states the position best, and Dewey quotes him at length in Experience and Nature: If we believe we came out of the universe, not it out of us, we must admit that we do not know what we are talking about when we speak of brute matter. We do know that a certain complex of energies can wag its tail and an-other can make syllogisms. These are among the powers of the unknown, and if, as may be, it has still greater powers that we cannot understand . . .why should we not be content? Why should we employ the energy that is furnished to us by the cosmos to defy it and to shake our fist at the sky? It seems silly.... That the universe has in it more than we understand, that the private soldiers have not been told the plan of campaign, or even that thereis one . . . has no bearing on our conduct. We still shall fight—all of us be-cause we want to live, some, at least, because we want to realize our spon-taneity and prove our powers, for the joy of it, and we may leave to the un-known the supposed final valuation of that which in any event has value to us. It is enough for us that the universe has produced us and has within it, as less than it, all that we believe and love.50 This is where Dewey’s philosophy of action begins and why I believe it pre-supposes a view of tragedy. Because once we stop pondering God’s intent or seeking to disclose that which purportedly lies behind the world of appearance, we are confronted with the tragic choices of fragile human beings seeking a bit of security in the here and now, and hoping, reasonably, for a better future for their children. His is a philosophy that begins with human agency and historical/natural limitations, accenting the fact that all we hold dear lies in this world, and that, with intelligence and a bit of luck, that’s all we need to flourish.

#### History based conceptions of black identity that make blackness the sole determinant of agency prevent us from recognizing the joy and multidimensionality in black life and different responses to suffering

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (78-79) NP 3/3/17.

In my view, three difficulties—descriptive, theoretical, and existential—attend such accounts. The descriptive problematic involves the plotline of the story. I am reminded here of James Baldwin and Ralph Ellison’s criti-cisms of Richard Wright. Both worried that Wright’s representations of black life betrayed the complexity of African American existence. The same can be said of stories of African American experience that are mainly about liberation and presuppose a subject in constant struggle. There is much more to our living than simply resisting white supremacy. More-over, the singular focus often results in a relatively coherent account in which the internal fissures of black communities are obscured. Suffering and resistance then subordinate all other considerations—even the dif-ferential experience of that suffering and the different aims of resistance. The theoretical problematic refers to the Christian dimension of the problem of being both black and Christian. Like Anderson, I worry that God talk among black theologians, at least in their worst moments, functions merely as a source of the strenuous mood, serving simply to justify and sanctify a particular political orientation—even though it is precisely in our relation to God and His relation to us that we resist oppression.24.Lastly, the existential problematic again entails a simplification of the complexity of African American lives. The existential involves how to live, how to hope, and how to love. But if our lives are reduced simply to struggle and our stories presume an understanding of black agency as always already political, then the various ways we have come to love and hope are cast into the shadows as we obsess about politics, narrowly un-derstood, and as History orients us retrospectively instead of prospec-tively. We end up, despite our best intentions, ignoring the sheer joy of black life and unwittingly reducing our capacity to reflect and act in light of the hardships of our actual lives. Perhaps, more importantly, “our abil-ity to make delicate distinctions” is lost as History settles beforehand the difficult existential questions “Who am I?” “How should I live?” and “What should I do?”

#### Religion allowed slaves to find agency despite systems of domination

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (108-109) NP 3/3/17.

Obviously, the experience of conversion held tremendous implications for the life of the slave. The slave was made anew, transformed by the re-ordering presence of God. Her embrace of Christianity then reflected a fundamental transformation of the spirit. As a result, God’s presence in the slaves’ lives, Raboteau would have us believe, short-circuited the ultimate power of the master-slave relationship. The slave was now beholden to a master who was no respector of persons. This insight informs Raboteau’s effort to disrupt an account of slave agency as necessarily a political act. Raboteau’s use of the example of a slave known as Praying Jacob illus-trates the power of the slaves’ spiritual agency.[Praying Jacob] was a slave in the state of Maryland. His master was very cruel to his slaves. Jacob’s rule was to Pray three times a day, at just such an hour of the day; no matter what work was or where he might be, he would stop and go and pray. His master has been to him and point his gun at him, and told him if he did not cease praying he would blow out his brains. Jacob would finish his prayer and then tell his master to shoot in welcome—your loss will be my gain—I have two masters, one on earth and one in heaven—master Jesus in heaven, and master Saunders on earth. I have a soul and a body; the body belongs to you, master Saunders, and the soul to Jesus.43 Praying Jacob’s power derived from a supernatural concern that led him to extol a kind of independence from his master. Otherworldliness precipitated a form of rebelliousness, but that agency was bound up with submission to divine agency. Such a formulation runs counter to the ef-forts of many black liberation theologians to render the power of African American Christianity in principally political terms.44The conversion experience equipped the slaves with the resources to imagine themselves as agents in the world. That is to say, the reordering presence of God in the lives of Christian slaves made possible a sense of individual and communal value that rejected the dehumanizing effects of slavery. Material representations of this sense of self—in the form of prayer meetings, sermons, and song—provided the existential armor to endure the terror of slavery. Raboteau’s answer to the question about how the embrace of Christian doctrine substantively aided the slave thus involves an exploration (and an interpretation) of the theological innovations of African American Christianity, not so much to ascertain the truth-value of its claims as to examine the way such beliefs and practices informed the lives of those who held and engaged with them.

### Ontology

#### Black identity is not fixed – rather, it changes in relation to complexity of particular contexts, evolving based on the way one interacts with the world. A pragmatist view of identity is best

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (8) NP 3/4/17.

This book attempts to show that pragmatism can help address some of the more challenging dimensions of contemporary African American politics. But I maintain that it first ought to undergo a reconstruction of sorts. Pragmatism must be made to sing the blues. In chapter 1,I argue that, contrary to standard accounts, John Dewey’s reconstruction of moral experience insists on the tragic dimension of our moral lives: that we are consistently confronted with competing values that often require that some good or value is butchered. I then put Dewey in conversation with one of America’s greatest writers, Toni Morrison. Dewey indeed has re-sources capable of addressing what Stanley Cavell describes as the work ofmourning,18but my reading of Morrison aims to reconstruct those re-sources in light of the racialized experiences that haunt American life. What might it mean to think of the tragic in the context of those black persons forced to forge a self amid the absurdities of a society still fundamentally committed to racist practices? I suggest that Morrison’s novel exemplifies what it means to hold a pragmatic view of the tragic that takes seriously the often brutal realities of white supremacy. Morrison, then, teaches Dewey a lesson about race, American democracy, and the often tragic choices imposed on this country’s darker citizens. The chapter thus opens the way for a more sustained encounter between pragmatism as I understand it and African American political life. Chapters 2, 3,and 4examine how pragmatism might aid us in rethinking the various ways appeals to black identity, history, and agency impact the form and content of African American political activity. Too often such appeals settle political matters beforehand. Black history, for some, constitutes a reservoir of meaning that predetermines our orientation to problems, irrespective of their particulars, and black agency is imagined from the start as bound up with an emancipatory politics. When identity is determined by way of reference to a fixed racial self, the complexity of African American life is denied. Moreover, the actual moral dilemmas African Americans face are reduced to a crude racial calculus in which the answers are somehow genetically or culturally encoded. My aim in these chapters is not to deny the viability of black identity talk, appeals to black history, or something like black agency. Instead, I bring my pragmatic commitments to bear on these notions in order to open up ways in which we might reimagine African American politics for the twenty-first century. In chapter 2,for example, I maintain that we have approached the issue of black identity in the wrong way: that it is not some fixed and unchanging point of reference that determines, in advance of our actions, who we are. Rather, our identities turn out to be the products of efforts to dispose of problematic situations. This pragmatic approach gets us past some of the more troublesome dimensions of identity politics precisely because it locates identity formation in the messiness of our living and the problems we confront.

#### A categorical definition of blackness essentializes and ultimately fails – a pragmatic view of black identity is best since it accounts for particularity and the complexity of moral decisionmaking

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (50-51) NP 3/3/17.

I am also not interested in defending an essentialist conception of race or of black identity. Talk of racial essences is at best a bad way of talking about particular experiences; at worst it encourages misguided quests for certainty that aim to secure us from the contingency that is an inherent part of our lives. My intention is to offer a pragmatic way of thinking about black identity that takes seriously the problem-solving activity intrinsic to being a moral agent. My emphasis, then, will be on our capacity as black individuals to judge the respective claims of duty and desire asthey arise in concrete experience, understanding that in some cases they may indeed conflict. We will still speak of black identity but will attempt not to overextend its reach. When someone utters a sentence such as “I am an African American” in the context of a debate about public policy, she is not disclosing some-thing that was previously internal; instead, her words indicate to those around her that, in discussing this particular topic with her, another set of issues must be taken into account. Richard Rorty makes the point best: Such sentences are not used to report events going on within the Cartesian Theatre which is a person’s consciousness. They are simply tools for coordinating our behavior with those of others. This is not to say that one can “reduce” mental states such as beliefs and desires to physiological or behavioural states. It is merely to say that there is no point in asking whether a belief represents reality, either mental reality or physical reality, accurately. That is, for pragmatists, not only a bad question, but the root of much wasted philosophical energy.4The question, then, is not whether our beliefs about race and racial identities represent reality, but for what purposes it would be useful to hold such beliefs and to invoke them as crucial aspects of our identities. In what follows I sketch two ways of understanding black identity—what I call an archeological approach and a pragmatic historicist approach—in each case focusing on its ethical dimensions.5I argue that the pragmatic approach better enables us to understand the complex ethical choices that attend any talk about black identity. I further draw out the implications for contemporary debates about black identity of what I have called elsewhere a pragmatic tradition of racial advocacy, which emerged in the early nineteenth century as African Americans drew on the biblical story of Exodus to articulate a sense of peoplehood and racial obligation.6 end, I suggest that we have approached the issue of black identity from the wrong direction: it is not simply a question of who we are determining how we act in the world. Rather, the choices we make in the face of problems and meddlesome circumstances turn out to be our lives, requiring of us continual cultivation of our ability to make delicate distinctions.

#### Interpretation of black identity that see race as determinant essentialize and erase the particularity characteristic of moral life

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (53-54) NP 3/3/17.

A problem arises, however, when we postulate one single factor—the racial self—as an explanation for the moral lives of black people. The uncertainty and conflict that are characteristic of any situation properly called moral are obscured. The complexity that marks, for example, political decision making is reduced to a simple question of fidelity to one’s cultural inheritance: will one be authentically black or an Uncle Tom? Problems may involve issues of gender, class, sexuality, religious preference, geographic difference, or the difficulties of falling in love, but all can be resolved by an appeal to the good and to the notions of obligation that flow from an authentic way of being black in the world. Such simplifications of problematic situations reflect—and promote—a loss of the capacity to discriminate and to make delicate distinctions. The fact that we are often unsure of the right and just approach, and ignorant of the con-sequences of our actions, is lost. Moreover, our individuality is compromised as this idea of black identity, as Kwame Anthony Appiah rightly worries, “goes imperial” and implicates itself in cases where judgments and choices should instead be made with an eye to the particular forces impinging on us at the time.

#### Totalistic understandings of race that view black identity as fixed because of antecedent phenomena deny agency and moral complexity and contingency that are essential parts of life

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (83-85) NP 3/11/17.

My general aim in this chapter has been to insist on the complexity of African American religious life and to resist naïve attempts to reduce that complexity to an easily manageable political reality—a tendency that is, I believe, typical of this country’s melodramatic approach to the problems of race. I am of the firm belief that appeals to a fixed and stable notion of black identity, to a conception of history as a storehouse stocked with an-swers to all of our problems, or appeals to an idea of black agency that presumes our inclination to resist limit our imaginations and in various ways blunt our capacity to modify our conditions of living, precisely be-cause each denies the active work we do in the face of problematic situations. Such appeals too often direct our attention to antecedent and notconsequent phenomena. They seek to tame the potential chaos of contin-gency but end up obscuring the moral imperative that we act intelligently and earn our deaths by passionately embracing the conundrum of life. In short, bad thinking about African American history, identity, and agency compromises what James Baldwin referred to as all of that beauty—thosefunded experiences, colored in a dark shade of blue, that enable us to invade the future with a bit more than luck.

## A2 Abstraction bad

#### Dewey’s philosophy does not devolve to abstract questions of philosophers but rather is embedded in context and materiality – only his understanding of knowledge allows us to appreciate it as contextual and gives room for social improvement and revision of ideas

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7) NP 2/26/17.

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuing a future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidarity captures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

#### You can’t just read anti-ethics when you hear value criterion – pragmatism is just not abstract.

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (7) NP 2/26/17.

With these four general features in mind, Dewey’s view is consistent, as one would expect, with the characterization of pragmatism provided by Williams James. In Pragmatism, James powerfully describes the pragmatist as one who turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power.... It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against . . . dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality.15The good pragmatist, then, encourages a view of philosophy as social and cultural criticism, where the neat conundrums of the scholar’s professional practice give way to a certain kind of responsibility in our intellectual lives, where we take the tools of our training and work to offer some insight into specific conditions of value and into specific consequences of ideas. In this view, philosophy becomes, as Dewey argued, “a method of locating and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis.”

## A2 Hegel

#### The Hegelian approach to history fails by justifying tragedy and preventing us from coming to terms with the horrors of historical violence

West 89 summarizes and quotes Hook, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 121-22. NP 2/26/17.

Ironically, Hook's attempt to infuse American pragmatism with a deeper and richer form of historical consciousness than that of Dewey falls back on James's view of pragmatism as mediating and reconciling extreme positions. Within the historical arena, absent in James, this mediating and reconciling is tilted toward the victors rather than the victims of history, the first category including past victims who are present-day victors. This bias looms large in Hook's comparison of pragmatism with Hegelian historicism and Christian love. There are three generic approaches to the tragic conflicts of life. The first approach is that of history. The second is that of love. The third is that of creative intelligence in quest for ways of mediation which I call here the pragmatic.22 Hook rejects the Hegelian historicist approach because it "attempts to con-sole man with a dialectical proof that his agony and defeat are not really evils but necessary elements in the goodness of the whole."23 This "tapestry" theodicy rides roughshod over genuine tragedy, refusing to acknowledge how terrible history is. Hook also casts aside the agapic approach that overlooks the conflicts between the various love commitments people have. And the love ethic yields no means of adjudicating between these conflicts. For Hook, the appeal to divine love is empty since God loves everybody equally; this leads to the objectionable conclusion, for Hook, that "God loves Stalin no less than Stalin's victims."24

## A2 deleuze

#### No link -- the Deweyan ethic accounts for the unfixed nature of human identity and ethical standards – we are in a process of becoming

Glaude 7 on Dewey, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (24-25) NP 3/3/17.

This connection to the future forms the primary basis for responsibil-ity. For in the effort to secure our world for our children and ourselves, we employ methods that generate foresight. We make moral and political prognoses with an eye toward securing and expanding for future gen-erations the values we cherish. As Dewey writes in “The Development ofAmerican Pragmatism”: Pragmatism . . . does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon con-sequent phenomena; not upon precedents but upon the possibilities of ac-tion. . . . The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future into consideration. And this taking into consideration of the future takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James’s terms “in the making, in the process of becoming,” of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.20 Dewey’s accent on human agency presupposes a world that is always evolving. No guarantees. No fixed truths. Just the fragile attempts of finite creatures to flourish in an environment that impinges upon them daily. Here the mystery and awe we have felt in the face of a universe that is extraordinary (and which requires that we approach it with ceremonial scruples) is transferred to the human future.21 Our primary responsibility, then, is to act intelligently in order to ensure, as much as humanly possible, that this future is better than our present.

## A2 Cap

#### Marxist views of history are totalizing and reductive and ignore the complexities of emancipation

West 89, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 71. NP 2/25/17.

True to the American pragmatic grain, Dewey rejects the metaphysical residues in Marx: the Hegelian-inspired penchant toward totalizing history, universalizing collectivities, and simplifying emancipation. These residues tend to overlook the vast complexities of history, the sheer heterogeneity of collectivities, and the various complications of emancipation. Therefore, for Dewey, Marxist perspectives (given his rather frail yet still noteworthy grasp of them}2 tend toward premature totalities, and homogeneities that ignore uniqueness, difference, and diversity. Yet, like any other viewpoint, Marxisms have to be put to the tests of critical scrutiny, experimental consequences, and moral valuation. In the twenties (after his visit to Russia), Dewey celebrates the Soviet experiment in education, but by the mid-twenties he castigates Stalinism in quite harsh terms.3 For Dewey, the march of freedom in history is embodied in the best of American democracy, and the march of America in history is to be viewed criti-cally in light of the best of American democracy. He puts pragmatism on the international historical stage, yet he still views history through an American lens. In this way, Dewey -like Hegel and Marx - historicizes philosophy; and, like Emerson, James, and Peirce, Americanizes history. In short, Dewey tries to take history seriously as he creatively revises the Emersonian evasion of modern philosophy, carefully affirms the Emersonian theodicy, and critically enriches the American pragmatic tradi-tion. John Dewey is not only the giant of this tradition and the towering force in American philosophy; he is also the sifting funnel through which much of the best and some but little of the worst of American culture flow. As Horace Kallen noted in 1939, "As I see it, it will be Dewey, not Ford, not Edison, not Roosevelt, who, when the last word has been said and the last vote has been counted, will figure as the pregnant symbol of what is best in the America of today and most hopeful for the American-ism of tomorrow."4

#### Dewey’s retreat to discussing the appropriate structuring of educational institutions was itself a method of challenging capitalism and power dynamics by reclaiming ownership of knowledge

West 89, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 84. NP 2/25/17.

Dewey's third response to industrial capitalist America, now that he was living in the exemplary city of a changing country, was to invest and involve himself in the new emerging structure ofloyalty in the middle class: professionalism. Dewey was quite critical of various aspects of the rising pro-fessionalism; yet he remained its proponent and promoter. He was convinced that the only way in which America could acquire a core and cohesion was by producing and cultivating critical intelligence by experts. As head of the Department of Pedagogy (and Philosophy), he could focus on education, especially of children. As a professor, he could focus on his colleagues, i.e., occupational autonomy. The professional middle class was growing by leaps and bounds-with teachers increasing more than fourfold between 1890 and 1910 and then more than doubling again in the next decade.38 Dewey's shift to pedagogical practices was not a retreat from politics. Rather it proceeded from an acknowledgment of just how entrenched economic power was in America - seen quite clearly in the Pullman strike of 1894-and how circumscribed progressive action actually was. More-over, Chicago's school system was a national scandal as revealed by Joseph Mayer Rice's muckraking pieces in the Forum (1892, 1893). After working with and supporting the renowned Colonel Francis Parker's Cook County Normal School, including sending his kids there, Dewey emerged as the leading progressive pedagogue in the city. His laboratory school, known as the "Dewey School," opened in January 1896. The aim of the school was not only to serve as a model of how mean-ingful and enriching education could take place, but also to make a prac-tical intervention into the national debate on education. This practical intervention was, for Dewey, a form of political activism in that the struggle over knowledge and over the means of its disposal was a struggle about power, about the conditions under which cultural capital (skills, knowl-edge, values) was produced, distributed, and consumed. In sharp con-trast to curriculum-centered conservatives and child-centered romantics, Dewey advocated an interactive model of functionalistic education that combined autonomy with intelligent and flexible guidance, relevance with rigor and wonder. Of course, Dewey's functionalistic education, a critical education for democratizing society, could easily be mistaken for a func-tional education, a fitting education that simply adjusts one to the labor market possibilities.

#### Free communication is necessary to make the pragmatist methodology, which outweighs under the standard

West 89 summarizes Dewey, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 106. NP 2/25/17.

Similar to the concerns of Jiirgen Habermas in our own time, Dewey's preoccupation with communication proceeds out of a deep commitment to rational dialogue in an irrational culture. Dewey's notion of communi-cation, however, does not simply undergird a regulative ideal that fore-closes relativistic conclusions, but, more important, serves as the vehicle to create and constitute actual communities for the amelioration of existing circumstances. For Dewey, the move from "our Babel"lo5 to "the great community" is a matter of cultural politics, in which communication rest-ing upon shared values and promoting diversity must playa combative role. On the surface, it appears that Dewey has not really moved too far from his Thought News project with Franklin Ford of forty-three years earlier or the democratic sentiments he shared with T. H. Green, Henry Carter Adams, and his first wife, Alice (who died in 1927). But, on a deeper level, we can see that this is not so. First, Dewey is now more intent on making the experimental method accessible than on making the facts available. Second, he is more aware-though, in many ways, still not sufficiently aware-of the dynamics of power in capitalist America (especially given the Depression) than he was before. Third, his project is no longer a matter of simply making philosophy relevant by means of journalistic intervention in the popular marketplace of ideas, but rather of making society democratic by pitting popular cultural transformation against a dominating economic oligarchy.

#### Marxist social structures erase plurality and diversity making them inconsistent with the pragmatist method – no one theory of history can account for the totality of society///takes out Marxist critiques, route cause claims, wilderson

West 89 summarizes Dewey, Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 110-111. NP 2/25/17.

Notwithstanding his relative neglect of Marxism, Dewey's one effort to write about and against it is still noteworthy. In his book Freedom and Culture (1939), he attempts to take on foes of creative democracy on cultural grounds; that is, he critically compares the pluralistic and individualistic ways of life in a "democracy" and the monistic and collectivistic ways of life under "totalitarianism." The words in quotes remain abstractions throughout the book-atypical for Dewey. Yet his analyses do point out the significant degree to which Marxist conceptions of society often valorize totality, universal classes, unified movements, and homogeneous groupings at the expense of different social spheres, particular strata within classes, and diverse and heterogeneous ethnic, racial, and gender groups across classes. While Dewey hammers away at his old theme of allying democracy "with the spread of the scientific attitude,"116 he also makes claims some-what similar to those currently debated in contemporary post-Marxist circles concerning the explanatory weight of economic, political, cultural, and psychological spheres in history and society. Like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Stanley Aronowitz and Frank Cunningham, Dewey raises the methodological question: Is there anyone factor or phase of culture which is dominant, or which tends to produce and regulate others, or are economics, morals, art, science, and so on only so many aspects of the interaction of a number of factors, each of which acts upon and is acted upon by the others?1l7 Dewey quickly replies that his pragmatism rejects any attempts to invoke necessity and discern any single all-embracing causal force. Instead, "probability and pluralism are characteristics of the present state of science." Therefore, "the fundamental postulate of the discussion is that isolation of anyone factor, no matter how strong its workings at a given time, is fatal to understanding and to intelligent action."118

## A2 Hate speech

### Group harm can’t justify regulation of hate speech

#### Group harm should not be the basis for regulation of speech – it creates static conceptions of group identity constructed by the majority that disempowers minorities and undermines democratic principles and deliberation.

Post 91. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 267 (1991), <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/4>. NP 3/11/17.

This argument is powerful and requires close attention. In analyzing it, we can draw on the distinction that has emerged in feminist writings between "sex," which refers to biological facts, and "gender," which refers to socially constructed roles. 49 . To confuse the two, to predicate the social content of gender upon the biological fact of sex, is to fall into "the determinist or essentialist trap."50 The political point of the distinction is to keep perpetually open for discussion and analysis the social meaning of being born female and included within the group "women.' 51 Even if one is not free to opt out of the group, the possibility ought nevertheless to be preserved that the identity of the group be ultimately determined, in the language of Nancy Fraser, "through dialogue and collective struggle.' 52 Fraser writes that "[iun a society as complex as ours, it does not seem to me wise or even possible to extrapolate" the outcome of that dialogue "from the current, prepoliticized experiences and idiolects of women, especially since it is likely, in my view, that these will turn out to be the current prepoliticized experiences and idiolects only of some women."'1 Fraser's point is that regardless of the biological basis of sex, the social meaning of gender is a political issue whose outcome, like that of all political issues, must be regarded as indeterminate. She thus applies the structure of democratic self-determination to the constitution of group identity. The individualist assumptions of that structure create a form of communication in which political indeterminacy is preserved; they guarantee that the dialogue envisioned by Fraser will remain open to the perspectives of all women. If the identity of the group "women" were understood to have a content determinate enough to employ the force of law to silence dissenting views, the law would hegemonically impose the perspective of only some women.The same logic, I believe, holds true for racial groups. We must distinguish race as a biological category from race as a social category. Even if unfortunately "the attempt to establish a biological basis of race has not been swept into the dustbin of history,"' 54 it would nevertheless be deplorable to construct first amendment principles on the basis of a biological view of race. What is most saliently at issue is rather "race as a social concept": "The effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle."'55 To the extent that the social meaning of race is thus profoundly controversial156 - and it is controversial not merely for members of minority groups but also for the entire Nation 57 - the individualist premises of public discourse will ensure that it remains open to democratic constitution. This lack of closure may of course be threatening, for it casts the creation of group identity upon the uncertain currents of public discourse. The safe harbor of legal regulation may, by contrast, appear to promise members of minority groups more secure control over the meaning of their social experience. But that promise is illusory, for it is profoundly inconsistent with the analysis of racism prevalent in the contemporary literature. To the extent that racism is viewed as pervasive among whites, and to the extent that whites, as a dominant group, can be expected to hold the levers of legal power, there would seem little reason to trust the law to establish socially acceptable meanings for race. Such meanings cannot be determined by reference to easy or bright-line distinctions, as for example those between positive or negative ascriptions of group identity. The work of figures as diverse as William Julius Wilson,es Shelby Steele,159 and Louis Farrakhan160 illustrates how highly critical characterizations of racial groups can nevertheless serve constructive social purposes. To vest in an essentially white legal establishment the power to discriminate authoritatively among such characterizations and purposes would seem certain to be disempowering. 16 The conclusion that group harm ought not to justify legal regulation is reflected in technical first amendment doctrine in the fact that virtually all communications likely to provoke a claim of group harm will be privileged as assertions of evaluative opinion. 162 The following language, for example, gave rise to legal liability in Beauharnais: "If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, SURELY WILL."'163 Justice Frankfurter interpreted this language as a false factual assertion: "No one will gainsay that it is libelous falsely to charge another with being a rapist, robber, carrier of knives and guns, and user of marijuana."' 164 This interpretation, however, seems plainly incorrect. To accuse an individual of using marijuana is to assert that she has committed certain specific acts, but to accuse the group "blacks" of using marijuana is not to make an analogous assertion. Some blacks will have used marijuana, and most will not have. The question is thus not the existence of certain specific acts, but rather whether those acts can appropriately be used to characterize the group. The fundamental issue is the nature of the group's identity, an issue that almost certainly ought to be characterized as one of evaluative opinion. Because the social meaning of race is inherently controversial, most statements likely to give rise to actions for group harm will be negative assessments of the identity of racial groups, and hence statements of evaluative opinion. No serious commentator would advocate a trial to determine the truth or falsity of such statements; the point is rather that such statements should not be made at all because of the deep injury they cause. But in a context in which group identity is a matter for determination through political struggle and disagreement, the hypostatized injury of a group cannot, consistent with the processes that instantiate the principle of self-determination, be grounds to legally silence characterizations of group identity within public discourse.

### A2 no equal citizenship w hate speech

#### Equal citizenship can’t justify regulation of hate speech

Post 91. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 267 (1991), <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/4>. NP 3/11/17.

In balancing the value of equal citizenship against the principle of self-determination, however, we must ask who is empowered to interpret the meaning of the highly contestable value of equal citizenship. To the extent that the value of equal citizenship is used to justify limiting public discourse, the interpreter of the value cannot be the people, because the very function of the appeal to the fourteenth amendment is to truncate the communicative processes by which the people clarify their collective will. 3 5 In such circumstances the Ultimate Interpreter, whoever or whatever it may finally turn out to be, must impose its will without popular accountability. Our government currently contains no such Interpreter, not even the Supreme Court, whose constitutional decisions are always shadowed by the potential of constitutional amendment or political reconstruction through subsequent appointments. The impossibility of locating such an Interpreter suggests the difficulties that attend the argument from the fourteenth amendment.36

### A2 allowing racism = endorsing racism

#### Permitting racist ideas does not amount to an endorsement of them

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A second argument is that the failure to regulate racist ideas amounts to a symbolic endorsement of racist speech, which is intolerable in "a society committed to ideals of social and political equality."'1 In essence this argument rejects the public/private distinction required by democratic self-governance. 128 But if responsibility for ideas advanced by individuals in public discourse were to be attributed to government, the government could not then also be deemed responsive to those ideas in the way required by the principle of self-determination. Just as a library could not function if it were understood as endorsing the views of the authors whose books it collects and displays, so also in a democracy the government could not serve the value of autonomy if it were understood as endorsing the ideas expressed by private persons in public discourse. 129

### A2 biases make discourse impossible

#### This does not justify regulation of speech since biases are inevitable in any discussion – rather, it calls for more persuasive discussion to counter problematic ideas, into censorship

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Once again, the premise of this argument appears sound, but its conclusion does not. Audiences always evaluate communication on the basis of their understanding of its social context. 95 This is not a deformity of public discourse, but one of its generic characteristics. 9 6 It poses the question of how an audience's prepolitical understanding of social context may be altered, a question that confronts all participants in public dialogue. The urgency of the question does not justify restricting public discourse; it is rather a call for more articulate and persuasive speech, for more intense and effective political engagement.

### A2 discourse fails

#### Double bind – either a. free discussion is so irretrievably impacted by racism that anti-racist views can not win out, which means that if they’re winning their arguments, their claims are more likely to be racist since the anti-racist view can’t advance, or b. they are winning that their claims are preferable through open discussion which proves that open discussion is possible and discourse isn’t irrevocably damaged

#### Indictment of public discourse as irrational can’t justify regulation of speech since this presumes an absolute notion of truth and undermines the safeguarding of individual freedom free speech protections enshrine

Post 91. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 267 (1991), <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/4>. NP 3/11/17.

But it is one thing to use the idea of false consciousness as a weapon within public discourse to convince others of the need to break with the prejudices of the past, and it is quite another to use the idea as a justification to limit public discourse itself. The first is a familiar rhetorical strategy. It is consistent with the processes of public discourse because its effectiveness ultimately depends upon its persuasive power. The second, however, presupposes an intimacy with truth so vital as to foreclose opposing positions. The very point of using the idea of false consciousness to limit public discourse is to justify legally disregarding certain perspectives, on the grounds that these perspectives could not possibly be respected as true expressions of autonomous individuality. Circumscribing public discourse to ameliorate false consciousness thus does not protect public discourse from harm, but rather contradicts its very purpose of providing a medium for the reconciliation of autonomous wills.

#### Even the notion that free speech is irrevocably tainted can only be resolved through free discourse – makes the claim self effacing

Post 91. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 267 (1991), <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/4>. NP 3/11/17.

The issue on the table is whether irrationality and coercion have so tainted the medium of public discourse as to require shrinking the scope of self-government. That issue significantly affects every citizen, and its resolution therefore cannot be ceded to the control of any particular group. In fact I do not see how the issue can be adequately resolved at all unless some notion of civic membership is invoked that transcends mere group identification. Unless we can strive to deliberate together as citizens, distancing ourselves from (but not abandoning) our specific cultural backgrounds, the issue can be resolved only through the exercise of naked group power, a solution not at all advantageous to the marginalized and oppressed.203 Paradoxically, therefore, the question of whether public discourse is irretrievably damaged by racist speech must itself ultimately be addressed through the medium of public discourse. Because those participating in public discourse will not themselves have been silenced (almost by definition), a heavy, frustrating burden is de facto placed on those who would truncate public discourse in order to save it. They must represent themselves as "speaking for" those who have been deprived of their voice. But the negative space of that silence reigns inscrutable, neither confirming nor denying this claim. And the more eloquent the appeal, the less compelling the claim, for the more accessible public discourse will then appear to exactly the perspectives racist speech is said to repress.

### A2 minorities are silenced

#### Silencing does not justify restraint on speech since it is racist ideas rather than their expression that lead to intimidation of minorities – even this argument cedes the importance of public debate

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Even if this burden is lifted, however, and it is simply accepted that members of victim groups are intimidated into silence, it would still not follow that restraints on racist speech within public discourse are justified. One might believe, for example, that such silencing occurs chiefly through the structural conditions of racism, rather than specifically through the shock of racist speech. "The problem," as the Chairman of the Black Studies Department of New York's City College recently remarked apropos of the racist comments of an academic colleague, does not lie with specific communicative acts, but rather with "racism" itself, "insidious in our society and built into our culture.."20 4 If that were true, restraints on racist speech would impair public discourse without at the same time repairing the silence of victim groups. Alternatively, one might believe that racist speech silences victim groups primarily because of its "ideas," because of its messages of racial inferiority, rather than because of its incivility. The distinction is important for the following reason: although it is consistent with the internal logic of public discourse to excise in extreme circumstances certain kinds of uncivil speech that are experienced as coercive, 20 5 it is fundamentally incompatible with public discourse to excise specific ideas because they are "analogously" deemed to be coercive. Public discourse is the medium within which our society assesses the democratic acceptability of ideas; to exclude certain ideas as prima facie "coercive" and hence destructive of public discourse is to contradict precisely this function. Therefore "harm" to public discourse cannot justify restraints on racist ideas on the grounds that such ideas are perceived to be threatening or coercive. 20 6

### A2 regulations are a symbol

#### Defense of symbolic regulation of speech fails by undermining the principle of civil discourse writ large – focusing on ameliorating structural exclusion is preferable to truncating discourse

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I believe, however, that this invitation to balance ought to be declined. This is not because balancing can be ruled out in advance by some "absolutist" algorithm; the attraction of a purely formal democracy may itself in extreme circumstances no longer command limitless conviction. It is rather because, in the American context, the temptation to balance rests on what might be termed the fallacy of immaculate isolation.2 16 The effect on public discourse is acceptable only if it is de minimis, and it is arguably de minimis only when a specific claim is evaluated in isolation from other, similar claims. But no claim is in practice immaculately isolated in this manner. As the flag burning example suggests, there is no shortage of powerful groups contending that uncivil speech within public discourse ought to be "minimally" regulated for highly pressing symbolic reasons. 2 17 This is evident even if the focus of analysis is narrowly limited to the structure of the claim at issue in the debate over racist speech. In a large heterogeneous country populated by assertive and conflicting groups, the logic of circumscribing public discourse to reduce political estrangement is virtually unstoppable. The Nation is filled with those who feel displaced and who would feel less so if given the chance symbolically to truncate public discourse. This is already plain in the regulations that have proliferated on college campuses, which commonly proscribe not merely speech that degrades persons on the basis of their race, but also, to pick a typical list, speech that demeans persons on the basis of their "color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age, handicap, or veteran's status.."218 The claim of de minimis impact loses credibility as the list of claimants to special protection grows longer. The point I want to press does not depend upon the intellectual difficulty of drawing lines to separate similar claims. It is rather that the remedial and political logic of equal participation applies with analogous force to a broad and growing spectrum of group claims. One might, of course, devise arguments, perhaps based on the specific history of the fourteenth amendment, to distinguish racial epithets from blasphemous imprecations, or from degrading and pornographic characterizations of women, or from vicious antigay slurs, or from gross ethnic insults. But the question is whether such arguments can withstand the compelling egalitarian logic that unites these various situations. My strong intuition is that they cannot, and hence that the claim of de minimis impact on public discourse is implausible.2 19 In the specific context of the argument from cultural exclusion, moreover, a refusal to balance is far less harsh than it might superficially appear. The fundamental challenge is to enable members of victim groups to reinterpret their experience within the American political and cultural order as one of genuine participation. There are a host of ways to address this challenge short of truncating public discourse. The most obvious and potentially effective strategy would be to dismantle systematically and forcefully the structural conditions of racism. If we were so blessed as to be able to accomplish that feat-if we were truly able to eliminate such conditions as chronic unemployment, inadequate health care, segregated housing, or disproportionately low incomes-then we would no doubt also have succeeded in ameliorating the experience of cultural exclusion.

## A2 technocracy

#### Dewey makes sense of the roles of experts in democracy without giving them too much power///probably useless

Rogers 10. (Melvin L. Rogers is currently the Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA.) Contemporary Pragmatism Editions Rodopi Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 2010), 69–91 Dewey and His Vision of Democracy Melvin L. Rogers. NP 3/12/17.

In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey is sensitive to the worry Lippmann advances, and, even the need for a division of epistemic labor between experts and the larger public that worry implies. Dewey’s position, however, is located in a larger framework regarding the relationship between experts and citizens that keep in view the problem of power, and which sees citizens not merely as authorizing power, but as genuinely authoritative in decision making. The desire to keep in view the issue of power partly helps explain his defense of democracy and his distinct and important descriptions of the role of the public and the state. For Dewey, it is democracy’s ability to better address the problem of power compared to other political ideals that might well prove to be its staying power. For Dewey, the vast complexities of the modern age have radically transformed the meaning of democracy and the role of the ordinary citizen. The various innovations in communication and transportation, the global scale of warfare, and the ever changing dynamics of a market economy make reliance on experts simply unavoidable. “We have,” explains Dewey, “inherited, in short, local town-meeting practices and ideas. But we live and act and have our being in a continental national state” (306). As a result, the view of the omni- competent citizen can only appear as an illusion. But what is important in the context of democratic decision making, he argues, is that we understand that how and why we rely on experts is itself a public judgment that makes social inquiry genuinely cooperative. Part of the aim of Dewey’s text, then, is to reimagine our relationship to expertise, both those of persons and systems, which acknowledge modern complexity and therefore the central role of experts. But he absorbs the role of experts within his vision of democracy, without conceding much of what we find morally appealing in democracy. The above point emerges when he describes the relationship between experts and the citizenry, revisiting themes expressed in his review of Lippmann’s work. In fact, the passage to which we will now refer sends us back to some of his reflections in 1888: The final obstacle in the way of any aristocratic rule is that in the absence of an articulate voice on the part of the masses, the best do not and cannot remain the best, the wise ceases to be wise. It is impossible for highbrows Dewey and His Vision of Democracy 81 to secure a monopoly of such knowledge as must be used for the regulation of common affairs. ... The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied (364). For Dewey, the hypotheses we form for responding to political problems are only as good as the methods we employ – that is, the extent to which the methods make us receptive to data from various parts of the environment. But problems themselves, as he argues, frame and guide our inquiry; they imply the existence of a complex horizon of value and meaning that is now fractured and in need of creative valuation to restore continuity. So Dewey’s point is not simply that without the input of the wearer of shoes the shoemaker will respond in a way that would not address the existing pinch. Rather, without input from the individual experiencing the pinch, the expert shoemaker will not have the subject matter to initiate or guide his inquiry.